250 e lusive v ictories
frustration, American offi cials found that vast U.S. assistance yielded
little leverage over the South Vietnamese government and military. On
the other hand, had Americans managed to assert greater control, they
would have confi rmed communist propaganda that Saigon was nothing
more than an American puppet—a crippling label in a country trying
to shed its colonial past.
Johnson’s March 31, 1968, decision to restrict bombing to the part of
the DRV below the 20th parallel fi nally created the opening for negoti-
ations. Th e two sides agreed to meet in Paris, with the American dele-
gation headed by two experienced diplomats, Cyrus Vance and Averill
Harriman. Le Duc Th o assumed leadership on the North Vietnamese
side. He was uncompromising in public, but the American team
believed private talks off ered a more promising path. Battlefi eld setbacks
had persuaded the Politburo to accept terms consistent with its mini-
malist position—reunification over time. At a private meeting on
September 12, 1968, Th o said South Vietnam could remain indepen-
dent and neutral, while Washington and Hanoi might establish diplo-
matic relations. But the United States must halt all bombing, and the
war would continue, too, if the Americans tried to shift the fi ghting to
its allies in the “neocolonial” South. Harriman answered that American
forces would withdraw when the NVA did, and he restated the Amer-
ican commitment to provide reconstruction aid. In a subsequent
meeting, Th o off ered to let GVN representatives join the discussions in
exchange for a complete cessation of air attacks, though he remained
vague about when the talks might start. Johnson agreed to the full
bombing halt, though he held off a public announcement.
The South Vietnamese were another matter, however: as a lame
duck, Johnson had even less leverage than before over Th ieu and Ky.
When Cliff ord made his fi rst Saigon visit since replacing McNamara,
the GVN leaders demanded enormous quantities of new equipment,
hedging against an American pullout that might leave them to face the
communists alone. Later, as the private talks in Paris made progress,
Thieu grew increasingly anxious. He also became convinced (not
without reason) that his government would do better under the fol-
lowing American administration, expecting Richard Nixon to be
elected. Harriman and Vance still hoped to begin the next phase of
negotiations before the election. Having earlier agreed to begin the talks