290 e lusive v ictories
Extrapolating from the Balkans examples, some 300,000 to 400,000
troops would be needed in Iraq, a number far larger than the invasion
force Rumsfeld envisioned. Meanwhile, the State Department prepared
a massive, multivolume study of Iraqi postwar challenges and potential
problems, “Th e Future of Iraq.” Although too unwieldy and academic
to serve as the basis for a postwar plan, the study highlighted the magni-
tude of the issues the United States might face. Colin Powell,
concerned that CENTCOM had given too little attention to postwar
matters, met with the president on August 5, 2002, to caution that the
United States would claim ownership of a country of 24 million and
needed to be better prepared for the responsibility. Analysis by other
agencies warned that regime loyalists might organize resistance against
invading forces, the Iraqi economic infrastructure might be badly frayed
by years of sanctions and neglect, and intra-communal tensions (Sunni
versus Shiite versus Kurd) might erupt into violence. Sometimes the
concerns became public, as in September 2002, when Lawrence
Lindsay, the president’s chief economic advisor, estimated that the war
and its aftermath might cost $100–$200 billion. Many experts cautioned
against the disruptive eff ects of disbanding the Iraqi military and against
overzealous efforts to cleanse government institutions of Baathist
infl uence.
Rumsfeld had no intention of sharing any of the responsibility for
postwar planning with other agencies. For the State Department, in
particular, the defense secretary showed utter disdain, convinced that it
had bungled its share of postwar responsibility in Afghanistan. Condo-
leezza Rice tried to orchestrate an interagency process to overcome
Pentagon resistance, but her efforts were no match for Rumsfeld’s
willful opposition. Bush unwittingly abetted his defense secretary’s
obstructionism by frowning on internal dissent over his Iraq agenda.
Th ose who called attention to potential problems or anticipated a more
diffi cult and costly postwar phase were seen as disloyal. Th us Lindsay’s
high fi gure for the price of the invasion and its follow-up earned him
the scorn of other offi cials, and he was forced out before the end of
-
Th e president remained largely detached from the internal debates
over postwar Iraq. He refused to intervene to force Rumsfeld to coop-
erate with the other players. As time passed with no semblance of a