t he p erils of o ptimism 315coupled with an effort to prepare the Iraqi military to take over—
essentially a continuation of the current Abizaid-Casey policy. Simi-
larly, the administration’s unpublicized interagency review concluded
on November 26, 2006, that an accelerated version of the current policy
made the most sense. Only a minority, mostly National Security
Council staffers, backed the surge. Among policy experts and
informed politicians generally, it seemed time to look for a graceful exit.
Some recommended a “soft partitioning” of Iraq that would turn it into
a loose federation of states, each dominated by its main ethno-sectarian
group, eff ectively ratifying the sorting process already under way.
With the public showing less patience for the war, moreover, it
would be hard to sell a troop surge. Th e magnitude of public disen-
chantment became clear on election day when voters handed control of
Congress to the Democrats. As is usually the case with elections, a
number of factors contributed to Republican losses, but disapproval of
the president’s Iraq policy fi gured high on the list—only 29 percent
approved of his handling of the war. Th e day after the voters had
spoken, Bush accepted Rumsfeld’s resignation, too long delayed
whether measured by results or political value. Incoming Democratic
leaders Representative Nancy Pelosi (soon to become Speaker of the
House) and Senator Harry Reid (the next Majority Leader) made plain
that bringing home the American troops would be one of their top
priorities. From the new congressional majority, the notion of sending
additional brigades to Iraq could expect little support.
Pressure for a gradual troop withdrawal increased when the Iraq
Study Group made public its recommendations in early December.
Pronouncing the current U.S. policy to have run its course without
yielding success, the ISG proposed that American combat troops (other
than those needed for force protection) be withdrawn from Iraq by
early 2008. Th ey might remain in the region to continue to combat
extremist forces and help police a political resolution. Further, the ISG
urged diplomatic overtures to Syria and Iran to enlist their support for
a stable Iraq. At the insistence of one ISG member, former Democratic
Senator Chuck Robb, the report included a temporary troop increase
among its list of options.
The thrust of the report’s recommendation, though, ran in the
opposite direction, and the commission aligned itself with the swelling