324 e lusive v ictories
the table, the president’s record suggests he would have simply stayed
the course through the end of his second term.
Th is in turn highlights Bush’s inability to recognize the endemic
problem of wartime presidential leadership: how early choices compro-
mise freedom of action. By the time he acknowledged that Iraq was
slipping into chaos, most policy options were off the table; his own
rhetorical commitment made withdrawal impossible (notwithstanding
the political cover provided by the ISG report), while the troops needed
for a dramatic escalation were unavailable and any attempt at a major
military expansion would have failed in Congress.
On the other hand, Iraq also demonstrates that war sometimes
creates new possibilities for exercising presidential agency, if only on a
limited scale. U.S. commanders on the ground received no direction
from Washington as the insurgency gained momentum. Left to their
own devices to deal with a confl ict for which they had not prepared,
these offi cers initially stumbled. But over time, midlevel military leaders
used their freedom to experiment to rediscover and invent more
eff ective counterinsurgency methods. Concepts such as “seize, hold,
and build” and an emphasis on population security percolated up from
the fi eld. Had it not been for this frontline innovation and the thinking
it stimulated in higher military circles, the operational foundation on
which the surge rested would never have existed. In this way, the war
itself yielded an operational alternative without which Bush’s belated
intervention would have been meaningless.
Finally, after the president committed the additional troops in early
2007, he returned to the method of leadership by delegation. He stood
back, moreover, despite the fact that he had banked everything on an
unproven commander pursuing an untested operational approach.
Unexpected events play a large role in warfare, and they ultimately
worked to the president’s advantage in Iraq. Th e Sunni Anbar Awakening
took American military commanders and diplomats in Iraq by surprise.
Although various American actions contributed to the willingness of
tribal leaders to reach out to the U.S. military, the Awakening owed more
to their fear of the foreign jihadists in AQI who had overplayed their hand
and overstayed their welcome. Analysts will continue to debate the rel-
ative importance of the Awakening and the troop surge in stemming the
violence beginning in summer 2007. But there seems no question that