Elusive Victories_ The American Presidency at War-Oxford University Press (2012)

(Axel Boer) #1

348 e lusive v ictories


Other forces also limit the control a president can exercise at the end
of a confl ict. Domestic politics quickly resumes its peacetime form, as
Congress reasserts its role and the public turns its attention back to
matters closer at hand. Nowhere was this demonstrated more vividly
than when Wilson sought approval for the League of Nations. Wilson
represents but the extreme case of a common pattern: every wartime
president has faced the same dynamic. Th us, after the signing of the
Paris Peace Accords in early 1973, Congress moved to bar the future use
of American forces in Southeast Asia without explicit congressional
approval, which the lack of public concern guaranteed would not be
forthcoming. Domestic pressures have also compelled rapid demobili-
zation following major wars, leaving presidents with fewer troops to
police peace arrangements.
The window of opportunity for a president to shape postwar
outcomes opens only briefl y. Johnson could not miss the point, given
that peace talks with Hanoi did not begin until he had announced his
decision not to seek reelection. Others have deferred peace-building
preparations in the mistaken belief that they would have ample time
after the guns fell silent or because they underestimated the complex-
ities of their postwar aspirations. Wilson misjudged how much pull he
would retain after an armistice, so he postponed seeking Entente
agreement with his agenda instead of exploiting the desperate British
and French need for American help in early 1918. More recently, in the
mistaken confi dence that Iraq could be easily remodeled into a liberal
democratic society, Bush paid minimal attention before the invasion to
the plans for the postwar occupation. Nixon missed his moment to
enlist domestic, especially congressional, support for a long-term
security relationship with South Vietnam because he placed undue
faith in his diplomatic abilities and his capacity to use demonstrations
of brute force to influence communist behavior. As the exception,
Roosevelt showed the keenest sensitivity to the limited time in which
he could exercise broad infl uence over the postwar order. His adminis-
tration orchestrated domestic backing for a new international organi-
zation at the most opportune moment, while his most critical military
decision—the invasion of Northwest Europe—balanced the risks of
military failure with the gain from checking the advance of the Red
Army across Central Europe.

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