356 e lusive v ictories
disproportionate allocation of resources toward the military encourages
presidents to opt for military solutions. Moreover, should all other
policy tools fail, the use of force still remains an option.
Second, when war cannot be avoided, aim low. Th at is, establish
modest goals. Presidents who have embarked on a war with transfor-
mative objectives have fallen far short, spurring a political backlash that
stimulates isolationist inclinations that have always been a part of the
American sensibility. Many consequences of military conflict are
unplanned; often these are the result of actions taken by leaders who
placed excessive faith in their ability to control outcomes. If modest
objectives seem insuffi cient to justify recourse to arms, military action
is not worth the asking price. Transformative ambitions also tempt
leaders to persist in supporting failing military ventures beyond the
point of diminishing returns.
Th ird, when preparing for war, plan backward. Gideon Rose advises
political and military leaders to jump ahead to the ultimate goal rather
than to focus on the fi rst step. Th e place to begin, he says, is with the
desired political outcome. Th en planners should consider each step that
must be accomplished to get there. To this I would add that in seeking
a political outcome, presidents and those around them need a heavy
dose of realism and rigorous external scrutiny. Those in the Bush
administration who envisioned a democratic post-invasion Iraq knew
what they wanted to achieve. They also convinced themselves that
things would fall neatly into place once Saddam Hussein and his
henchmen were ousted. In short, they thought they had planned realis-
tically. Presidents need independent (and skeptical) assessments of their
designs for postwar settlement. Th e more ambitious the objective—that
is, the more profoundly the end state diff ers from the status quo ante
bellum—the more searching should be the review of war plans and the
links between military action and the desired outcome.
Fourth, recognize that freedom of action declines. Th e inescapable
dynamic of wartime presidential leadership—as I have argued, empha-
sized, and highlighted—is the loss of control or discretion. Th e initial
decisions therefore require the closest scrutiny, calling for hands-on
direction by the commander in chief. Unless a president gets it right
up front, he stands little chance of accomplishing the objectives he has
established. With this suggestion, though, comes an important caveat,