c onclusion 357drawn from the historical cases we’ve considered: even deep
engagement at the top in the lead-up to war and in its early stages does
not guarantee success.
Last, from the outset, focus attention on peace-building. Given the
inexorable decline in freedom of action, presidents must move
quickly—even prematurely—on plans for peace, including building
political support at home when the design of a postwar settlement rests
on long-term American commitments. Sometimes this means the work
needs to be done even before the fi ghting begins; always, the ground-
work needs to be laid before combat ends. Both domestic and interna-
tional political circumstances will strip away presidential leverage
immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. Further, since battlefi eld
success may be empty of value if what follows is bungled, peace-
building demands as much active presidential direction as the choice of
military commanders and strategy.
Th is asks a great deal of a president. Good intentions alone won’t cut
it. To anticipate conditions at the end of the war calls for broad vision
and keen foresight, tempered by a cold appreciation of the limits of
American military power and political infl uence. Certainly, a president
should enlist the best minds. But if hands-on leadership is needed
anywhere, it is here. Th e stakes are too high for the task to be delegated
and the plans given cursory review.
War imposes responsibilities on citizens, not just on their leaders. As
citizens, we need to be deeply skeptical about claims of what can be
achieved by recourse to force. More than anything else, the record of
wartime presidents underscores the limits of power: despite increasing
capacity to infl ict violence on a foe, no president has achieved all of his
objectives. Some have accomplished none of them. Even the greatest
wartime leaders, Lincoln and Roosevelt, while securing military vic-
tories vital to the country’s survival, could not build the kind of postwar
order they sought. We should note, too, a disturbing trend: even as the
United States increases its military advantages over all other nations,
eff ective presidential wartime leadership has been declining. Th is is due
to the mismatch between the tools of war at a president’s command and
the kinds of wars the United States fi ghts. If nothing else, this decline
should feed healthy and justifi ed popular doubt about the necessity of
force and the viability of visionary goals.