376 notes to pages 46‒56
- For revealing fi gures on the disparity in industrial resources, see James M.
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: Th e Civil War Era (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988), 318–19. - Hattaway, “Lincoln’s Presidential Example in Dealing with the Military,”
20–21. - McPherson, Tried by War , 34.
- On the development of the Union’s western strategy, see Hattaway,
“Lincoln’s Presidential Example in Dealing with the Military,” 23. - McPherson, Tried by War , 199.
- William J. Cooper Jr., Jeff erson Davis, American (New York: Vintage,
2001), 488. - For a discussion of Lincoln’s relations with each of these commanders, see
Boritt, ed., Lincoln’s Generals. - Until January 1863, the Army of the Cumberland was known as the Army
of the Ohio. Its history is covered in detail in Larry J. Daniel, Days of
Glory: Th e Army of the Cumberland, 1861–1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 2004). - On the history of this formation, see Steven J. Woodworth, Nothing but
Victory: Th e Army of the Tennessee, 1861–1865 (New York: Vintage Civil
War Library, 2006). - Peter Cozzens, Th e Darkest Days of the War: Th e Battles of Iuka and
Corinth (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 322 - Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military
History of the Civil War (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983, 1991),
377, 391. - Hattaway, “Lincoln’s Presidential Example in Dealing with the Military,”
20. - See Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the
Civil War , 5 volumes (New York: Macmillan, 1949–1959). - Cohen, Supreme Command , 49–50.
- Cohen credits Lincoln with a striking capacity to act without illusions.
Cohen, Strategic Command , 22. Although this was true in the main, there
were glaring and costly exceptions, - McPherson, Tried by War , 34–35.
- McPherson, Tried by War , 63.
- McPherson, Tried by War , 187–89, 209–10, 216–17.
- Th e fullest account of this campaign is Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862:
Stonewall Jackson’s Valley Campaign (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2008). - Lincoln’s eff ort to goad Meade into an attack remains a controversial
subject to this day. On one side are those who maintain that, because a
successful assault might have ended the war, it was worth the obvious
risks; the counterargument holds that Meade would have thrown away
the fruits of a great victory by sending his battered army (which itself