Elusive Victories_ The American Presidency at War-Oxford University Press (2012)

(Axel Boer) #1

394 notes to pages 158‒163



  1. Kimball, Juggler , 132–33.

  2. On the diff erences between Churchill and Roosevelt over the future of
    colonialism, see Kimball, Juggler , 68–72. Churchill’s statement followed
    the British triumph at El Alamein in November 1942. Andrew Roberts,
    Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West,
    1941–1945 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 295.

  3. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 519–20.

  4. Kimball, Juggler , 39–40, 84.

  5. Kimball, Juggler , 87.

  6. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 543–44.

  7. Quoted in Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 412.

  8. Th e planners erred on the number of divisions the United States would
    fi eld and other details, but as a starting point it served well for military
    leaders and civilian mobilization offi cials. From an initial fi gure of 215
    divisions, the total was revised downward to the fi nal tally of 90. Larrabee
    suggests there was too little margin for error because only two divisions
    had not been committed to combat by the end of the war. Larrabee,
    Commander in Chief , 145. On the other hand, as I point out below, the
    number was suffi cient for a relatively extravagant approach in the Pacifi c
    with two lines of advance against Japan. Had manpower resources really
    been insuffi cient, the United States could have adapted by pursuing a
    single thrust against Japan.

  9. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 121–24.

  10. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear , 623.

  11. When disputes continued between Nelson and the services, the president,
    declining to be drawn directly into the fray, established the Offi ce of War
    Mobilization under James Byrnes, an experienced political fi xer, to over-
    see the entire mobilization eff ort and mediate disputes between the WPB
    and other agencies, including the military. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear ,
    622–23, 629; Eisner, State in the American Political Economy , 199–204.

  12. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 176–77, 198, 444–45.

  13. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 218.

  14. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear , 619.

  15. Kimball, Juggler , 189.

  16. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear , 652–55.

  17. Th e United States produced a total of 92 aircraft carriers between 1940
    and 1945. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 92.

  18. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear , 624.

  19. Eisner, State in the American Political Economy , 211–12. Eisner notes that
    the various wartime tax measures made the system more comprehensive
    (most workers paid income taxes for the fi rst time) and progressive (the
    top rate applied to all income over $200,000).

  20. Infl ationary pressures mounted and were only partly contained by taxes
    and savings. After a decade of Depression-generated price defl ation,

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