For representative photographs, see the illustrations in Christopher R.
Gabel, Th e U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Army Center of Military History, 1991).
Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 36.
Richard W. Steele, “Preparing the Public for War: Eff orts to Establish a
National Propaganda Agency, 1940–41,” American Historical Review 75 (6)
(October 1970): 1640–53, at 1642.
Steele, “Preparing the Public for War,” 1646ff.
Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 117–18.
Steele, “Preparing the Public for War,” 1650. Th e restriction did not
prevent the president from sending U.S. Marines to Iceland, which he
redefi ned as part of the Western Hemisphere.
Steele, “Preparing the Public for War,” 1640n.
Ambrose, “‘Just Dumb Luck,’” 61.
Historical counterfactuals are always open to challenge, and this one is
no exception. As I discuss later, a successful invasion of northwest Europe
hinged on a number of factors. Important though the buildup of Ameri-
can forces in England was, an argument could be made that Germany
also needed to be weakened by ongoing losses on the Eastern Front and
in the Mediterranean before an invasion could be mounted with a fair
prospect of success.
Kimball, Juggler , 76–77; Brian L. Villa, “Th e U.S. Army, Unconditional
Surrender, and the Potsdam Proclamation,” Journal of American History 63
(1) (June 1976): 66–92, at 70.
Th omas Fleming, Th e New Dealers’ War: F.D.R. and the War within
World War II (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 174ff. ; Villa, “U.S. Army,
Unconditional Surrender, and Potsdam Proclamation,” 70–71.
Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 504.
Eric Larrabee also comments on the diffi culty of adjusting the goal of
unconditional surrender as the fi ghting neared an end. See Larrabee,
Commander in Chief , 10.
Kimball, Juggler , 7–8. Even Kimball, who argues for the larger coherence
of Roosevelt’s postwar vision, concedes, “What he did not want is much
clearer than what he wanted.” Kimball, Juggler , 103–4.
Kimball, Juggler , 96.
On Roosevelt’s attitude, see Greg Robinson, By Order of the President:
FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2001) , chap. 3.
Kimball, Juggler , chaps. 3 and 5.
Kimball, Juggler , 86–87. Interestingly, Charles de Gaulle perceived
that two of the four powers Roosevelt expected to sustain peace after the
war would be beholden to the United States. Larrabee, Commander in
Chief , 634.
