396 notes to pages 169‒174
- Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 20–21, 25–26.
- Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 318. For a detailed account of MacArthur’s
role in the unsuccessful defense of the Philippines, see Richard
Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines (Woodstock:
Woodstock Press, 2001). - Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 12, 321ff ., esp. 351.
- Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 176–78.
- Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 68–69.
- Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 173–74. Th e American emphasis on the
European theater did not become clear in numerical terms until late 1943.
Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 468. - See especially Roberts, Masters and Commanders.
- Andrew Roberts, who relies heavily on the British record and is under-
standably infl uenced by the perspective of British participants, accepts
the characterization of the American approach as one that favored a full
frontal assault on the German army in France. He labels this the “Ulysses
S. Grant” view of warfare, which refl ects a further misunderstanding of
American methods. Grant did not favor frontal attacks; his Vicksburg
campaign was a brilliant example of maneuver warfare. Roberts, Masters
and Commanders , 69–70. - Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 498–99.
- Many historians and military analysts regard the Wehrmacht of the 1940s as
the most profi cient military of its day and accept the British view it could
not be bested on even terms. Th e inexperienced American military leader-
ship in 1942 failed to appreciate the qualitative advantages of the German
Army. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 137–38. For a contrasting view, see
Keith E. Bonn, When the Odds Were Even: Th e Vosges Mountains Campaign,
October 1944 – January 1945 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994, 2006). Even
if one questions the superiority of the Wehrmacht , however, it is hard to see
the U.S. Army achieving success without fi rst ascending a learning curve.
As Larrabee concisely frames it: “We needed a place to be lousy in.” North
Africa served as that place. Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 436. - Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 139, 223.
- Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 215.
- Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 138.
- My view of the sequence of decisions follows that of Andrew Roberts.
See Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 579ff. - Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 129.
- Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 133–34, 138–39; Roberts, Masters and
Commanders , 171–72, 232–33. - Roosevelt promised the Russians a second front in 1942 and felt obliged
to off er some kind of action in the European theater at least as a sign of
good faith. Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 174–75. - Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 290.