REFORM AND RECOVERY 145
act refl ected offi cial Spanish concern over the large
volume of contraband in the estuary. It also re-
fl ected fear of a possible foreign attack on the area
by the British, who had recently entrenched them-
selves in the nearby Malvinas, or Falkland, Islands,
or by the Portuguese who, advancing southward
from Brazil, had established the settlement of Sac-
ramento on the banks of the estuary, a base from
which they threatened shipping and the town
of Montevideo. To put an end to this danger, the
Spanish government mounted a major military ex-
pedition designed to establish full control of both
banks of the river. The commander Pedro de Ceval-
los came out with the temporary title of viceroy of
Buenos Aires. In 1778 the viceroyalty was made
permanent with the appointment of the viceroy
Juan José de Vértiz y Salcedo, whose rule of over
a decade saw a remarkable growth in the prosper-
ity of the area. This prosperity owed much to the
decree of “free trade” of 1778, which authorized
direct trade between Buenos Aires and Spain and
permitted intercolonial trade. In 1783 the estab-
lishment of a royal audiencia at Buenos Aires com-
pleted the liberation of the Río de la Plata provinces
from the distant rule of Lima. The inclusion of Up-
per Peru in the new viceroyalty, with the resulting
redirection of the fl ow of Potosí silver from Lima to
Buenos Aires, signifi ed a stunning victory for the
landowners and merchants of Buenos Aires over
their mercantile rivals in Lima.
The trend toward decentralization in the ad-
ministration of Spanish America, combined with
a greater stress on supervision and control from
Madrid, refl ected not only the struggle against for-
eign military and commercial penetration but an
enlightened awareness of the problems of commu-
nication and government posed by the great dis-
tances between the various provinces, an awareness
spurred by advances in cartography and knowledge
of the geography of the continent in general. Two in-
dications of this tendency were the greater autonomy
enjoyed by the captaincies general in the eighteenth
century and the increase in their number. Thus
Vene zuela and Chile were raised to the status of a
captaincy general. The increased autonomy enjoyed
by the captains general enabled an enlightened ruler
like Ambrosio O’Higgins in Chile to attempt major
economic reforms, stimulate mining and manufac-
turing, introduce new crops, and in general try to
promote not only the interests of the Spanish crown
but the welfare of the Chilean people.
The creation of new viceroyalties and captain-
cies general went hand in hand with another major
political reform: the transfer to the colonies between
1782 and 1790 of the intendant system, already in-
troduced to Spain by France. This reform was made
in the interests of greater administrative effi ciency
and in the hope of increasing royal revenues from
the colonies. The intendants, provincial governors
who ruled from the capitals of their provinces, were
expected to relieve the overburdened viceroys of
many of their duties, especially in fi nancial matters.
Among their other duties, the intendants were ex-
pected to further the economic development of their
districts by promoting the cultivation of new crops,
the improvement of mining, the building of roads
and bridges, and the establishment of consulados
and economic societies. Under their prodding, the
lethargic cabildos or town councils were in some
cases stirred to greater activity. The Ordinance of
Intendants also abolished the offi ces of corregidor
and alcalde mayor, notorious vehicles for the op-
pression of the natives. These offi cials were replaced
as governors of indigenous towns by men called
subdelegados, who were nominated by the inten-
dants and confi rmed by the viceroys.
Many of the intendants at the height of the re-
form era were capable and cultivated men who not
only achieved the objectives of increased economic
activity and revenue collection but promoted edu-
cation and cultural progress generally. But the
same could not be said of the majority of their sub-
ordinates, the subdelegados, who, like their prede-
cessors, soon became notorious for their oppressive
practices. A common complaint was that they con-
tinued to compel the natives to trade with them,
although the repartimiento had been forbidden by
the Ordinance of Intendants. The great popular re-
volts of the 1780s were fueled in large part by the
failure of the indigenous and mixed-blood popula-
tions to share in the fruits of the eighteenth-century
economic advance, whose principal benefi ciaries
were Spanish and creole landowners, mine own-
ers, and merchants.