Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1

Ethics 211
same as temperance, just as insight and wits are [the same] as prudence
and sharing and generosity are [the same] as good-heartedness; for they
have been given names by reference to their relative dispositions. And
one must note this too in each of the other virtues.
Sm. Again, of good things, some are unmixed, such as knowledge,
while others are mixed, such as having good children, a good old age, a
good life. Having good children is the natural and virtuous possession
of children; good old age is the natural and virtuous use of old age; and
similarly for a good life.
Sn. It is always clear in these cases that there will be similar divisions
of [the corresponding] bad things.
So. They say that what is worth choosing and what is worth taking
are different. For what stimulates an unconditional impulse is worth
choosing, . In
so far as what is worth choosing differs from what is worth taking, to
the same degree what is in itself worth choosing differs from what is in
itself worth taking, and in general for what is good by comparison with
what has value.



  1. Since man is a rational, mortal animal, social by nature, they say
    also that all human virtue and happiness constitute a life which is consis-
    tent and in agreement with nature.
    6a. Zeno defined the goal thus: 'living in agreement'. This means
    living according to a single and consonant rational principle, since those
    who live in conflict are unhappy. Those who came after him made further
    distinctions and expressed it thus: 'living in agreement with nature',
    supposing that Zeno's formulation was an incomplete predicate. For
    Cleanthes, who first inherited [the leadership of] his school, added 'with
    nature' and defined it thus: 'the goal is living in agreement with nature'.
    Chrysippus wanted to make this clearer and expressed it in this way: 'to
    live according to experience of the things which happen by nature.' And
    Diogenes: 'to be reasonable in the selection and rejection of natural
    things'. And Archedemus: 'to live completing all the appropriate acts'.
    And Antipater: 'to live invariably selecting natural things and rejecting
    unnatural things'. He often defined it thus as well: 'invariably and un-
    swervingly to do everything in one's power for the attainment of the
    principal natural things'.
    6b. 'Goal' is used in three senses by the members of this school: for
    the final good is said to be the goal in standard scholarly language, as
    when they say that agreement is the goal; and they say that the target is
    the goal, for example, they speak of the life in agreement by reference
    to the associated predicate; in the third sense they say that the ultimate
    object of striving is a goal, to which all others are referred.

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