212 l/-95
6c. They think that the goal and the target are different. For the target
is the physical state [lit. body] set up [for people] to try to achieve ...
[lacuna] ... those who aim at happiness, since every virtuous man is
happy and every base man is, by contrast, unhappy.
6d. And of good things, some are necessary for happiness and some
are not. And all the virtues and the activities which employ them are
necessary; joy and good spirits and the practices are not necessary. Simi-
larly, of bad things some are necessary, as being bad, for the existence
of unhappiness, and some are not necessary. All the vices and the activities
based on them are necessary; all the passions and ailments and things
like this are not necessary.
6e. They say that being happy is the goal for the sake of which
everything is done and that it is itself done for the sake of nothing else;
and this consists in living according to virtue, in living in agreement,
and again (which is the same thing) in living according to nature. Zeno
defined happiness in this manner: 'happiness is a smooth flow of life'.
Cleanthes too used this definition in his treatises, and so did Chrysippus
and all their followers, saying that happiness was no different from the
happy life, although they do say that while happiness is set up as a
target, the goal is to achieve happiness, which is the same as being
happy.
So it is clear from this that [these expressions] are equivalent: 'living
according to nature' and 'living honourably' and 'living well' and again
'the honourable and good' and 'virtue and what participates in virtue';
and that every good thing is honourable and similarly that every shameful
thing is bad. That is also why the Stoic goal is equivalent to the life
according to virtue.
6f. They say that what is worth choosing differs from what is to be
chosen. For every good is worth choosing, but every advantage is to be
chosen, and [advantage] is understood with reference to having the good.
That is why we choose what is to be chosen, for example being prudent,
which is understood with reference to having prudence; but we do not
choose what is worth choosing, but if anything, we choose to have it.
Similarly too all goods are worth enduring [for] and worth standing
firmly by, and analogously in the case of the other virtues, even if there
is no name for them. And all advantages are to be endured [for] and to
be stood firmly by. And in the same manner for the others which are in
accordance with the vices.
- After giving a sufficient account of good things and bad things and
what is worth choosing and what is worth avoiding and the goal and
happiness, we think it necessary to go through in their proper order what
is said about things indifferent. They say that things indifferent are