Ethics 241
[of the action]), so too it is a [moral] mistake to fear, to grieve, and to
suffer desire, even quite independently of their outcome. Rather, just as
the latter are not dependent on their posterior consequences, but are
[moral] mistakes right from the outset, similarly the actions which proceed
from virtue are to be judged to be right from the outset and not by their
ultimate completion.- 'Good', which has been used so frequently in this discussion, is
also explained with a definition. The definitions offered by [the Stoics]
do differ from each other, but only very slightly; for all that, they are
getting at the same point. I agree with Diogenes who defined good as
that which is perfect in its nature. He followed this up by defining the
beneficial (let us use this term for ophelema) as a motion or condition
which is in accord with what is perfect in its nature. And since we acquire
conceptions of things if we learn something either by direct experience
or by combination or by similarity or by rational inference, the conception
of good is created by the last method mentioned. For the mind attains
a conception of the good when it ascends by rational inference from those
things which are according to nature. 34. But the good itself is not
perceived to be good or called good because of some addition or increase
or comparison with other things, but in virtue of its own special character.
For honey, although it is the sweetest thing, is nevertheless perceived to
be sweet not because of a comparison with other things, but because of
its own distinctive flavour; in the same way the good, which is the subject
of our discussion, is indeed most valuable, but that value derives meaning
from its distinctive type and not from its magnitude. For value (which
is called axia) is not counted as either good or bad; consequently, however
much you might increase it, it will still remain in the same general
category. Therefore, there is one kind of value which applies to virtue, and
it derives its meaning from its distinctive type and not from its magnitude.
Cicero On Goals 3.62-70 (selections) [11-103]
- Again, they think it important to understand that nature has brought
it about that children are loved by their parents. For from this starting
point we can follow the development of the shared society which unites
the human race. One ought to see this first of all from the form and
organs of the body which show that nature has a rational scheme for
reproduction; but it would be inconsistent for nature to want offspring
to be born and yet not to see to it that they are loved once they are born.
The power of nature can be seen even in the beasts; when we see the
effort they go to in bearing and rearing their offspring, we seem to be
listening to the voice of nature herself. So, just as it is obvious that we