Ethics 255
Chrysippus says that nothing is useful to base men, and that the base
man makes use of nothing and needs nothing. After saying this in book
one of his On [Morally] Perfect Actions he goes on to say later that utility
and gratitude extend to intermediate actions, none of which is useful
according to the Stoics. (1038b) Moreover, he also says that nothing is
congenial or fitting for the base, in following words: "similarly, nothing
is alien to the virtuous man and nothing is congenial to the base man,
since one of these properties is good and the other is bad." So why does
he grind on in every single book on physics, and even, by Zeus! on ethics,
writing that as soon as we are born we are congenial to ourselves and to
our parts and to our offspring? And in book one of On Justice he says
that even beasts find their offspring congenial in accordance with the
needs of the offspring, except in the case of fish; for even the unhatched
eggs are nourished by themselves. (1038c) But there is no sense-percep-
tion for those to whom nothing is perceptible and there is no congeniality
for those to whom nothing is congenial. For congeniality seems to be a
perception and grasp of what is congenial.
Sextus Empiricus M 11.22-30 (SVF 3.75) [11-115]
- The Stoics cling to the common conceptions and define the good
as follows: "good is benefit or what is not other than benefit." By benefit
they mean virtue and virtuous action, and by not other than benefit they
mean the virtuous man and a friend. 23. For since virtue is the leading
part of the soul in a certain state, and virtuous action is an activity in
accordance with virtue, they are immediately beneficial. And the virtuous
man and the friend, who themselves belong to the class of good things,
would not properly be termed benefit, but neither would they be other
than benefit, for the following reason. 24. For, the followers of the Stoics
say, the parts are not the same as the whole nor are they different in
kind from the whole; for example, the hand is not the same as the whole
man (for the hand is not a whole man), nor is it other than the whole,
since the entire man is conceived of as a man together with his hand.
So, since virtue is a part of the virtuous man and of the friend, and the
parts are neither the same as the whole nor other than the whole, it is
said that the virtuous man and the friend are not other than benefit.
Consequently, every good thing is encompassed by the definition, whether
it is immediately a benefit or is not other than benefit. - Hence and consequently they say that good is said in three senses;
and they outline each of its meanings in its own formulation. For one
sense of good, they say, is that by which or from which it is possible to
be benefitted, which is indeed the most fundamental sense and is [the