Sextus Empiricus: Ethics 387
present exists nor the past nor the future, time is nothing, for that which
is comprised of non-existents is itself non-existent.
- This argument is also used against time. If time exists either it
is generable and destructible or ungenerable and indestructible. But it is
not ungenerable and indestructible, at least if the past is said to exist no
longer and the future not yet to exist. 148. But it is not generable and
destructible either. For things that are generated must come to be from
something existing, and things that are destroyed must be destroyed
into something existing, according to the hypotheses of the dogmatists
themselves. If, therefore, time is destroyed into the past, it is destroyed
into something which does not exist; and if it is generated from the
future, it is generated from that which does not exist, for neither the
past nor future exist. But it is absurd to say that something is generated
from that which does not exist or is destroyed into something which
does not exist. Therefore, time is neither generable nor destructible.
And if it is neither ungenerable and indestructible nor generable and
destructible, it does not exist at all. - In addition to these arguments, since everything that comes to
be seems to be generated in time, if time comes to be, it is generated in
time. So, it comes to be either in itself or each comes to be in another
time. But if it comes to be in itself, the same thing will exist and will
not exist. For since that in which something comes to be ought to exist
prior to that which comes to be in it, time, insofar as it comes to be, is
not yet, but insofar as it comes to be in itself, is already. 150. So, it does
not come to be in itself. But neither does one time come to be in another
time. For if the present comes to be in the future, the present will be
the future, and if it comes to be in the past, it will be the past. The same
points ought to be made about the other times [viz., past and future].
So, one time does not come to be in another time. If time comes to be
neither in itself nor each time in another time, then time is not generable.
And it has already been shown that it is not ungenerable. So, since it is
neither generable nor ungenerable, it does not exist at all, for each thing
which exists should be either generable or ungenerable.
Ethics
Sextus PH 3.168-197 [III-48]
Ch. xxi On the Ethical Part of Philosophy
- There remains the ethical part of philosophy, which seems to be
concerned with the discernment of things good and bad and indifferent.