388 /l/-48
In order that we may discuss ethics summarily, we shall investigate the
existence of things good, bad, and indifferent, first setting forth the
conception of each.
Ch. xxii On Things Good, Bad, and Indifferent
- The Stoics say that good is 'benefit' or 'not other than benefit'
meaning by a 'benefit' virtue and virtuous action, and by 'not other than
benefit' the virtuous man and the friend. For 'virtue,' being the leading
part of the soul in a certain state, and 'virtuous action', being a certain
activity according to virtue, are exactly 'benefit', while the virtuous man
and the friend are 'not other than benefit.' 170. For a benefit is a part
of the virtuous man, that is, the leading part of his soul. But, they say,
the wholes are not the same as their parts, for a man is not his hand,
nor are they other than their parts, for they do not exist without the
parts. Therefore, they say that wholes are not other than their parts. For
this reason, the excellent man, being a whole in relation to his leading
part (which they have said is benefit) is not other than benefit. - They go on to say that 'good' is spoken of in three ways. In one
sense, they say 'good' is that by which something is benefitted, which is
the principal sense [of good] and is virtue; in another sense it is that in
accordance with which being benefitted is a characteristic result, as virtue
and virtuous actions; in the third sense it is that which is such as to
benefit, and this is virtue and virtuous action and the excellent man, and
the friend, and gods and excellent daimons; so the second meaning of
'good' includes the first and the third includes the second and first. 172.
Some say that 'good' is that which is worth choosing for its own sake;
others say it is that which contributes to happiness or fulfils it. And
happiness is, as the Stoics say, a 'smooth flow of life'.
Now these are the sort of things said about the conception of the good.
Ch. xxii On Things Good, Bad and Indifferent
- If someone holds that the good is what benefits or what is worth
choosing for its own sake or that which is a co-contributor to happiness,
he does not offer a definition of 'good,' but rather one of its accidents;
and this is pointless. For either the above-mentioned accidents belong
to the good alone or also to other things. But if they do belong to other
things, they are not unique characteristics of the good, since they are
generalized; whereas, if they belong uniquely to the good it is not possible
for us to understand from them what the good is. 174. For just as someone
who has no conception of a horse does not know what neighing is, nor
is able to arrive at a conception of a horse by means of [this] if he has
not previously happened upon a neighing horse, so one who is seeking