backing the ussr 2.0similar to non- voting, the negative effect was small in absolute
terms. The percentage of respondents apparently swayed by the
Putin cue was marginal relative to the total sample size.
Theoretical significance: Prospective group status within
dynamic state identity
Ethnic identity matters to the extent that the state identity is at
stake. Ethnic non- Russians were significantly more likely than
ethnic Russians to support the expansion of Russia to the entire
territory of the former Soviet Union. Ethnic Ukrainians and
Belorussians were significantly more likely than ethnic non- Slavs
and ethnic Russians to support incorporating into Russia the
entire territory of Ukraine and Belarus. The study design ruled
out that these differences could be ascribed to socio- demographic
factors – age, sex, income, education and location or size of
the settlements where respondents resided. Furthermore, the
comparison- of- means tests ruled out that these differences were
a likely by- product of differences in ingroup pride (ethnic or
civic), socio- tropic economic valuations (that have been shown to
significantly affect intergroup tolerance), or political preferences
Table 6.2 Responsiveness to Putin’s message that ethnic diversity
strengthens Russia in a split- sample experiment, 2013 NEORUSS surveys
in the Russian Federation and the cities of Moscow, Vladivostok and
Krasnodar
RUSSIAN NON- RUSSIAN
No cue Putin cue No cue Putin cue
(N = 1,467) (N = 592) (N = 122) (N = 42)Strengthens 10.3 11.0 32.0 26.2
Partly strengthens,
partly weakens
62.3 62.8 55.7 59.5Weakens 27.4 26.2 12.3 14.3
Note: In the ‘no cue’ sub- sample, respondents were asked if they believed ethnic
diversity strengthened, somewhat strengthened and somewhat weakened, or
weakened Russia. In the ‘Putin cue’ sample, the same question was prefaced with
the statement: ‘Putin claims that ethnic diversity strengthens Russia.. .’