the new russian nationalismis also something of a more general ‘rally- around- the- political-
system’ effect. Both the 2013 and 2014 NEORUSS surveys asked
respondents to rate ‘the political system that exists in our country
today’ on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 was ‘very bad’ and 10
was ‘very good’. While 4–8 per cent in both surveys said that they
could not give an answer, among the rest we can note a dramatic
change during the period in question. In May 2013, the average
score was 3.3, decidedly on the negative end of the spectrum. By
November 2014, the average assessment had shifted all the way
to 6, making the mean score positive instead of negative. And, of
course, the political system is widely understood to be dominated
by the individual figure of Putin.
The NEORUSS surveys show that this rallying effect extended
from general positive feelings toward Putin and his political system
to views as to how competent he is in handling issues related
to nationalism. Both the 2013 and 2014 NEORUSS surveys
asked Russians which among the potential presidential candi-
dates listed in Figure 7.2 would be best able to deal with issues
related to Russia’s national identity. Strikingly, in May 2013,
only 14 per cent named Putin, a mere 5 per cent more than named
Zhirinovskii (9 per cent). In fact, the combined total who selected
other potential candidates was markedly greater than the share
who chose Putin himself; moreover, a clear majority either found
the question too hard to answer (27 per cent) or explicitly volun-
teered that there was no difference among the candidates (another
27 per cent). By November 2014, however, the share of those
who named Putin had more than doubled to 34 per cent, leaving
Zhirinovskii in the dust with just 4 per cent and Communist Party
leader Gennadii Ziuganov a distant second with 5 per cent. The
combined share of respondents who either felt unable to say (18
per cent) or who perceived no difference among potential leaders
(28 per cent) was still greater than those who named Putin, but
this was now a minority and the surge in the perception of Putin’s
competency on this issue is impressive. The survey also finds evi-
dence that perceptions of Putin’s competence on nationalist issues
had grown more broadly: a similar question on the issue of immi-
gration from Central Asia, the Caucasus and China found that the
share of Russians who singled Putin out as ‘most competent’ rose