the new russian nationalismmainstream media. Yet, the general public seems to have resisted
these impacts, or perhaps any such impacts were short- lived and
had dissipated by November 2014. Of course, one reason for this
is that Russian pride was already quite high before the dramatic
events of 2014. What we seem to have been witnessing in 2014,
therefore, is less a surge in Russian nationalism than an activation
of sentiment that was already there, but now became directed
toward support for the Kremlin.
Indeed, almost all of the numerous other indicators of ethnic
nationalism considered in the NEORUSS surveys have remained
relatively stable. One is the number of respondents who say they
support the slogan ‘Russia for [ethnic] Russians’ (Rossiia dlia
russkikh). This slogan hinges on the linguistic distinction between
two terms both typically translated as ‘Russian’ in English: russkii
tends to imply a specifically ethnic category whereas rossiiskii is a
more civic concept that explicitly unites the whole range of ethnic
groups historically associated with the Russian state.^7 It is note-
worthy that the official name of Russia, the Russian Federation,
uses the term rossiiskii. Thus the call ‘Russia for ethnic Russians’
suggests a move away from a more civic to a more ethnically
exclusive Russia. Overall, the surveys reveal that 63, 64 and 66
per cent of respondents express complete or partial support for
the slogan in 2005, 2013 and 2014, respectively. The share of
those completely endorsing the slogan also remained stable – at
31, 27 and 33 per cent. The increase from 2013 to 2014 lies
within the combined sampling error margin. Similarly, support
for other ways in which ethnic Russians may deserve a privileged
group position in Russia has also remained fairly stable. About
three- quarters of respondents in 2013 and 2014 believed that top
government jobs should go primarily to ethnic Russians – with
about 39 and 40 per cent, respectively, supporting this idea fully.
In 2005, about 80 per cent of respondents agreed with this privi-
lege for ethnic Russians, with 48 per cent supporting it fully – so,
if anything, such exclusivist sentiment has declined over the past
decade. Additionally, in both 2013 and 2014 about half of the
respondents fully supported the idea that ethnic Russians must
play the leading role in the Russian state, and about 82–84 per
cent backed it at least partially. Again, the pattern seems to be