changes in russian nationalist public opinion 2013–14the same income level as the respondents, but presumably those
Ukrainians who chose to migrate specifically to Russia rather than
to other parts of Ukraine to escape the conflict were among the
most Russian- oriented migrants, those most likely to be viewed
favourably by Russian respondents. The fact that unwillingness
to have Ukrainians marry into the family increased substantially
even for this particular Ukrainian population, then, suggests that
it may well have increased more regarding Ukrainians who are
not migrants and who have lower income levels. Our survey also
finds that relatively few people actually report having much sig-
nificant contact with relatives and friends in Ukraine; 64 per cent
say that they have no friends or relatives of any kind, or even
acquaintances, in Ukraine. Geopolitical perceptions seem to have
trumped the essentialist ‘fraternal people’ rhetoric.
The dynamic of out- group acceptance – when we look at
respondents who chose 8, 9 and 10 on the intermarriage accept-
ability scale for migrants – is also consistent with this inter-
pretation. For most ethnic groups in 2013, the proportion of
such respondents was less than 5 per cent (Azeris, Chechens,
Georgians, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Roma and Chinese) or just
under 10 per cent (Armenians and Jews). The two exceptions
were Belarusians and Ukrainians – migrants from each group
were considered highly desirable for marriage by about a third
of respondents. These views remained about the same (within the
sampling error margin) in 2014. Ukrainians were not among the
groups for which the pattern of most positive responses changed;
people who were the very most favourable to Ukrainians in 2013
tended to remain favourable in 2014. This means that strongly
exclusionist views of Ukrainians increased primarily among
those whose answers in 2013 had been somewhere mid- range on
the NEORUSS survey scale. A separate question indicates that
while Russians became less willing to intermarry with Ukrainian
migrants, they were generally tolerant of Ukrainian refugees from
the conflict coming to Russia; only 12 per cent would favour
having Russia’s borders closed to them, while 51 per cent felt they
should be aided and their return to Ukraine facilitated.
Interestingly, the greatest changes from 2013 to 2014 regarding
potential intermarriage with migrants involved Belarusians and