how nationalism and machine politics mix in russiacrisis of 2008–9 hit Russia. To be sure, Putin’s (and Medvedev’s)
approval levels did not collapse as many had predicted, even
during the sharp economic decline that occurred in 2009. This
reflects the fact that, contrary to some interpretations, Putin’s
support has from the beginning been about much more than
the economy. These other bases of support, first and foremost
popular support for his leadership style and capacities and broad
ideational connections with the electorate, prevented a free- fall in
his overall approval ratings. But these ratings did start to decline, a
deterioration that had become noticeable as the 2011–12 election
cycle approached. The Kremlin exacerbated this problem on 23
September 2011, when Putin and Medvedev announced that the
former would return to the presidency, that the latter would take
Putin’s place as prime minister, and that this had been planned
long ago. This proved to be a public relations disaster, as people
widely felt duped and those who had liked the idea of the younger
Medvedev retaining the presidency were deeply disappointed,
especially since a recent lengthening of presidential terms meant
that Putin could be coming back for another dozen years. Putin
was even booed (whistled) at a sporting event on live television. A
vigorous new round of anti- American rhetoric dramatically failed
to save the day, also strongly suggesting that nationalism was no
‘magic bullet’ for the regime.^2
With its ratings dipping dramatically as the December 2011
parliamentary elections approached, the pro- Putin United Russia
party panicked. Many of its members evidently resorted to sig-
nificantly greater efforts to perpetrate fraud than had previously
been the case in order to compensate for the low ratings. But
these efforts were clumsy, often exposed on the Internet, some-
times by the party’s own former supporters. When official vote
totals turned out to give that party a significantly greater share of
the vote than was credible, protesters poured out into Moscow’s
streets in far larger numbers than had been seen since the start
of the Putin era. A major part of the surprise for the regime was
who was protesting: No longer primarily the pensioners who
had turned out in a large set of demonstrations against market
reforms in 2005 and that were periodically mobilised by the
Communist Party, but now the capital city’s emerging upwardly