how nationalism and machine politics mix in russiathe regime’s ‘playing the nationalist card’ could engender politi-
cal conflict more than broad support. The calculation leading
the Kremlin to keep nationalism to a secondary role in its public
appeal changed dramatically with the crisis in Ukraine and the
decline in the Kremlin’s other bases of support (most notably
the economic growth rate) leading up to 2014. By orchestrating
a referendum in Crimea for secession from Ukraine and acces-
sion to Russia, and by dramatically annexing it for the Russian
Federation, the Kremlin hit the sweet spot of Russian nationalism,
enhancing Russia’s purity from the perspective of narrowly ethnic
Russian nationalists while also restoring Moscow’s control over
more lands of the former USSR.
But while this move produced a dramatic surge in public
support for Putin and those associated with him in the short run,
it may have sown the seeds for political problems in the long or
even medium term. For one thing, while Crimea is a cause around
which both narrowly ethnic and broadly expansionist Russian
nationalists can agree, other moves are likely to generate tensions
even among nationalists. And the remaining areas where ethnic
Russians are a majority outside Russia present much greater
problems logistically for Russian territorial expansionists, lacking
local Russian military bases and having no clear and easily defen-
sible borders. A risk is thus that with their appetites whetted,
expansionist nationalists will fault Putin for not moving further
when he had the chance if he does not do so. But if he does do so,
he is likely to face challenges domestically from those unwilling to
pay a high price in terms of blood shed for the sake of these lands,
an influx of unwanted migrants, and/or the economic and politi-
cal instability that such moves may bring. In addition, if Crimea
fails to develop smoothly under Russian control, or if securing
its electricity or water from parts of Ukraine draws Russia into
further conflicts that it finds hard to control, even Crimea could
start to prove a liability to Russia’s leadership. ‘Rallying effects’
around leaders after victorious wars, much research concludes
(Baker and Oneal 2001), also tend to subside, at which point
Putin and his allies could come in for new challenges. Of course,
the logic of patronal presidentialism expects that such challenges
will be most acute as moments of expected succession approach,