Strawsonian Compatibilism 143two others also seem to be suggested, these arguments gain their force largely by
way of how they flow from the theory of responsibility animating his entire way
of rethinking the free will debate. Thus, very much unlike the other two contri-
butions we have considered, Strawson offers a “big picture” assessment of the
free will debate which is intended to reorient the way theorists think of the
debate itself—of what is at stake and what standards ought to be used to assess
the competing theses and arguments.
Suggestions for Further Reading
An especially interesting exchange can be found in a festschrift for Strawson
edited by Zak van Straaten, wherein two of Strawson’s eminently respected con-
temporaries, Jonathan Bennett and A.J. Ayer, offer critical papers on “Freedom
and Resentment” and Strawson then replies:
Ayer, A.J. 1980. “Free- Will and Rationality.” In Zak van Straaten, ed., Philosophical
Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1–13.
Bennett, Jonathan. 1980. “Accountability.” In Zak van Straaten, ed., Philosophical Sub-
jects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 14–47.
Strawson, P.F. 1980. “Reply to Ayer and Bennett.” In Zak van Straaten, ed., Philosophi-
cal Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 260–6.
Other important papers discussing Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” include:
Russell, Paul. 1992. “Strawson’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility.” Ethics 102:
287–302.
Shabo, Seth. 2012. “Where Love and Resentment Meet: Strawson’s Interpersonal Defense
of Compatibilism.” Philosophical Review 121: 95–124.
Shoemaker, David. 2007. “Moral Address, Moral Responsibility, and the Boundaries of
Moral Community.” Ethics 118: 70–108.
Sommers, Tamler. 2007. “The Objective Attitude.” Philosophical Quarterly 57: 321–41.
Vargas, Manuel. 2004. “Responsibility and the Aims of Theory: Strawson and Revision-
ism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85: 218–41.
Watson, Gary. 2014. “Peter Strawson on Responsibility and Sociality.” In David Shoe-
maker and Neal A. Tognazzini, eds., Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, vol.
2: “Freedom and Resentment” at 50. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 15–32.
Watson, Gary. 1987. “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian
Theme.” In Ferdinand Schoeman, ed., Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions:
New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 256–86.
Wolf, Susan. 1981. “The Importance of Free Will.” Mind 90: 386–405.
Here are three book- length treatments that are Strawsonian in important respects
and so draw heavily on the insights in “Freedom and Resentment” even if in
doing so they depart considerably from Strawson’s own view:
McKenna, Michael. 2012. Conversation and Responsibility. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.