176 Three Source Incompatibilist Arguments
14 Note that this is essentially what McKay and Johnson (1996) produced in their assault
on the Transfer principle (at work in the Consequence Argument) with their coun-
terexample—the example involving refraining from tossing a coin. (See our discus-
sion in Section 4.5.) This might not be immediately clear, since their example was
meant to show that powerlessness is not agglomerative. But, as we explained, the
principle of agglomerativity for powerlessness can be derived from the Consequence
Argument’s Transfer principle in conjunction with an unimpeachable logical prin-
ciple. So the counterexample McKay and Johnson produced to agglomerativity for
powerlessness was also a counterexample to Transfer, thereby proving Transfer
invalid.
15 There is a delicate point about the dialectic that we will not develop in the main body
of the text but is worth just noting. The reason we can safely set aside the incompati-
bilist objections of those unconvinced by the role of Frankfurt- style examples is that
such critics are bound to find an argument like the Consequence Argument compel-
ling as it pertains to moral responsibility. They will thus be less invested in drawing
upon an argument like the Direct Argument to establish their incompatibilism. By
contrast, the interlocutor who is more interesting here, given the relevance of the
Direct Argument to the wider controversy, is the incompatibilist who finds Frankfurt’s
argument compelling, who thus thinks the Consequence Argument is thereby ren-
dered beside the point (as regards moral responsibility), and who seeks another style
of argument for an incompatibilist conclusion. This sort of incompatibilist—a source
incompatibilist—is not in a position to object to the above means of resisting the
Direct Argument by complaining that Frankfurt- examples are unsuccessful.
16 This is roughly identical to McKenna’s proposed Transfer NR*** (McKenna, 2008c:
368).
17 For an excellent treatment of this issue and a thoughtful reply to Schnall and
Widerker, one developing the reply we have suggested here, see Loewenstein
(forthcoming).
18 TMA is the only argument form we will consider. But Mele (2008) distinguishes three
different forms. The first, which he calls a straight manipulation argument, is basi-
cally the form we have set out. The second form, a manipulation argument to the best
explanation, replaces the second premise as we have set it out with a best- explanation
premise of roughly the form, “the best explanation that S is not free and morally
responsible when manipulated in manner X into A- ing is that S is causally deter-
mined.” The third form, an original design argument of the sort Mele himself has
developed (2006b), works not from a case of an already existing agent who is manip-
ulated, but from an agent who is originally designed to perform some act, A. Although
there are important differences between these forms, what we have to say about TMA
carries over to these others as well.
Pereboom (2001; 2014) appeals to a best explanation in prosecuting his argument,
and Mele (2006b: 141–4) takes issue with Pereboom on this point. Below, we will set
out Pereboom’s argument, but in doing so, in the interests of simplicity, we will inter-
pret Pereboom’s argument as an instance of the TMA form. Thus, we will set aside
his appeal to a best explanation as well as his (2014: 82–6) reply to Mele on the via-
bility of this strategy.
19 Ayer’s proposal is basically the classical compatibilist view examined in Chapter 3.
We’ll examine the other compatibilist thesis in subsequent chapters. For present pur-
poses, readers can simply grant that Pereboom accurately identifies the three other
compatibilist proposals (Frankfurt’s, Fischer and Ravizza’s, and Wallace’s).