9 Contemporary Compatibilism
Mesh Theories, Reasons- Responsive
Theories, and Leeway Theories
1Three of the most widely discussed contemporary compatibilist theories are
mesh theories, reasons- responsive theories, and leeway theories. Mesh theories
account for free will in terms of a well- functioning harmony between different
elements within an agent’s psychic structure. Reasons- responsive theories
account for free will in terms of an agent’s somehow being sensitive to reasons
in the production of an action. Leeway theories focus primarily upon advancing
a contemporary account of leeway freedom. In this chapter, we focus on these
three approaches.
9.1. Mesh Theories: An Initial Characterization
A lean theory of freedom advanced by classical compatibilists like Hobbes and
Hume had it that a person acts freely just in the case there are no impediments to
her doing what she wants (see Section 3.1.1). If a person is chained up or threat-
ened at gunpoint, or has an epileptic seizure, she does not act freely. But if she is
doing what she wants, she does. A further conditional requirement was also
typically included, to the effect that the agent would do otherwise had she
wanted to do otherwise. All of this is compatible with the truth of determinism.
The appeal of this proposal was its simplicity. It required no special metaphysi-
cal extras beyond the normal functioning of human agency.
A shortcoming of the classical compatibilist’s proposal (as noted in Section
3.1.1) is that an agent’s lack of freedom may arise precisely from her own
desires. Desires arising from compulsive disorders, phobias, addictions, or psy-
chotic episodes could all be attributable to a person, and yet when she acts upon
them unencumbered by any external impediments—when they are causally effi-
cacious in leading her to action—it seems that she is not at all free. In essence,
they impair the agent, and yet they do so from sources that in some sense count
as elements of her own psychological constitution.
Can a compatibilist correct the failure of this classical compatibilist strategy
while preserving its basic intuitive appeal—that freedom is most fundamentally a
matter of the unimpeded operation of normally functioning human agency? One
option is to show that defective desires or intentions in the production of action
result from defective subsystems or processes within the overall architecture of