Free Will A Contemporary Introduction

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1

228 Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories


Suggestions for Further Reading


As with the previous chapter, we have covered a lot of ground. To begin, we’ll
simply list the most familiar pieces representative of the major positions we have
covered:


Bratman, Michael. 1997. “Responsibility and Planning.” Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):
27–43.
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. 1998. Responsibility and Control: An Essay on
Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt. Harry. 1971. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” Journal of
Philosophy 68: 5–20.
Haji, Ishtiyaque. 1998. Moral Appraisability. New York: Oxford University Press.
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2013. Causes, Laws, & Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn’t Matter.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Watson, Gary. 1975. “Free Agency.” Journal of Philosophy 72: 205–20. Reprinted in
Watson, Gary, ed., 1982. Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.


For an extremely impressive collection of critical essays devoted to Frankfurt’s
work, see the festschrift organized by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton:


Buss, Sarah, and Lee Overton. 2002. Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry
Frankfurt. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.


For further development of the views of Frankfurt, Watson, and Bratman, see
their books, consisting of collections of previously published articles:


Bratman, Michael. 2007. Structures of Agency. New York: Oxford University Press.
Frankfurt, Harry. 1999. Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Frankfurt, Harry. 1988. The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Watson, Gary. 2004. Agency and Answerability. New York: Oxford University Press.


For numerous essays by Fischer responding to his critics and developing further
his reasons- responsive theory, see his three books containing many of his articles
on these topics:


Fischer, John Martin. 2012. Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Fischer, John Martin. 2009. Our Stories. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fischer, John Martin. 2006. My Way. New York: Oxford University Press.


For thorough critical discussions of Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998) proposal, see:


Ginet, Carl. 2006. “Working with Fischer and Ravizza’s Account of Moral Responsib-
ility.” Journal of Ethics 10: 229–53.

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