Free Will A Contemporary Introduction

Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism 239

what would dissolve the responsibility- undermining luck that the scenario
involves. Such luck would dissolve if only it involved an agent with the power
to settle which decision occurs. Given an initial expectation that the scenario will
involve the decision’s being settled by an agent, the fact that this turns out to be
missing shows up as a disappearing agent.

10.4. Applying the Objections

These objections can straightforwardly be directed against the supposition that
Balaguer’s account can secure the control required for moral responsibility.
What do they look like when applied to his Ralph example? The events that are
causally relevant are:

E1: Ralph’s desiring at t1–tn to play for the Giants,

E2: Ralph’s desiring at t1–tn to star on Broadway,

and,

E3: Ralph’s desiring at t1–tn to marry Robbi Anna,

E4: Ralph’s desiring at t1–tn to manage the local Der Wienerschnitzel.

Let’s suppose that what actually results is:

E5: Ralph’s deciding at tn to move to New York,

E1–E4 do not settle whether E5 occurs, because the occurrence of E1–E4 renders
the occurrence of E5 only 50 percent probable. E1–E4 are compatible with the
nonoccurrence of E5—in fact, the nonoccurrence of E5 is 50 percent probable,
given E1–E4. So the occurrence of E5 would seem to be a matter of luck. More-
over, nothing in the scenario settles whether E5 occurs. Thus neither the agent
nor anything about the agent settles whether E5 occurs. So it appears that on this
event- causal libertarian view, using Balaguer’s categories, torn decisions cannot
be appropriately nonrandom, and the indeterminacy in question cannot increase
or procure the appropriate nonrandomness. Moreover, authorship is missing
given that such control is required for authorship.
In his defense of his event- causal account, Balaguer considers several ver-
sions of the luck objection. In his response to the rollback version, he contends
that “in each of the different plays of the decision, it is Ralph who does the
choosing” (2010: 93). More generally, in his view:

the most we could hope for, vis- à-vis authorship and control is that it be Ralph

who does the just- picking.... Ralph chooses – consciously, intentionally, and

purposefully – without being causally influenced by anything external to his

conscious reasons and thought. Thus it seems that in this case, we do get the

result that it is Ralph who does the just- choosing. And so it also seems that in