30 The Free Will Problem
will problem, explaining its various forms and dimensions. We’ll conclude the
chapter with a section devoted to situating the various positions one might take
on the free will problem within the broader currents of philosophy, currents that
can be appreciated by considering the general strategies philosophers might
adopt when attempting to understand our place as human beings within the
natural order.
2.1. Compatibilism and Incompatibilism
A fundamental divide among positions on the free will problem is marked by the
distinction between compatibilism and incompatibilism. Compatibilism is the
thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. More exactly:
Compatibilism is the thesis that it is metaphysically possible that determin-
ism is true and some person has free will.Incompatibilism is the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism.
More precisely:
Incompatibilism is the thesis that it is not metaphysically possible that deter-
minism is true and some person has free will.Further refinements are required to distinguish between different types of com-
patibilism and incompatibilism, but this is the most fundamental starting point.
Because of the intimate connection between free will and moral responsib-
ility, and because many participants in the free will debate are motivated prim-
arily by concerns about moral responsibility, one often finds versions of
compatibilism and incompatibilism expressed in terms of moral responsibility.
On these versions, compatibilism is the thesis that moral responsibility is com-
patible with determinism, and incompatibilism is the thesis that moral responsib-
ility is not compatible with determinism. Various other definitions we offer in
the remainder of this section could also be modified in this way. We will tend
just to definitions expressed in terms of free will. But we note that formulations
in terms of moral responsibility are also prevalent.^1
Several qualifications about the preceding definitions are needed. To begin,
the definition of compatibilism does not commit to the truth of determinism. It
tells us that if determinism were true, its truth would not entail that no person
ever acts freely. This definition does not entail that any actual person has free
will. It allows that while determinism is actually true, some other feature of all
agents rules out their having free will. It also allows that because indeterminism
of a certain sort is true, no actual agents have free will (Hobart, 1934; Hume,
1748). Nevertheless, for every philosopher we are aware of who has defended
compatibilism, free will is not just an abstract metaphysical possibility. It also
involves the further thesis that actual normally functioning human beings do
have free will and indeed do act freely. That is, beyond the strictly metaphysical