genes. We do not need to have children in order to reproduce our genes; we can
do so by helping those who are genetically closely related to us.
In elaborating his argument Salter employs the work of population geneticist
Luigi Cavalli-Sforza, who conducted a global survey (assay) of the distribution of
genes within and between populations. Salter argues that relatedness is a relative
concept, such that how closely two cousins are related actually depends on the
genetic distances existing in a particular population. In normal (Mendelian)
inheritance cousins are 0.25 related.^2 But this assumes that the kinship of two
randomly chosen individuals in a population is zero, and ‘if the world consisted of
only one ethny, the relatedness of random pairs would effectively be zero for the
purposes of estimating genetic interests; only genealogical kin would have higher
kinship’ (Salter, 2002: 119). In such a situation it would make sense simply to care
for your own family. However, in a world of ethnies it may be rational to act in
ways that are partial towards your ethnic compatriots. Using Cavalli-Sforza’s data
he argues that in a world consisting of just two ethnies – English and Danes – two
random English people would have a positive kinship of 0.0021, which is slightly
closer than the kinship of eight linear generations. What this means is that the
English and the Danes are quite closely related. However, Australian Aborigines
and the Mbuti people of Africa are not closely related, such that in a world in which
only these two ethnies existed two random Aborigines are almost as closely related
(0.43) as identical twins (0.5).
The third influence on Salter’s argument is Garret Hardin’s carrying capacity
argument, which is discussed in Chapter 16 (Ecologism). There are limits to the
carrying capacity of a territory, such that immigration will necessarily entail the
displacement of a population. It follows from the idea of genetic distance that the
loss of genes is greatest when the immigrating population is relatively distantly
related to the indigenous population. Salter argues that if 12.5 million Danes and
similar people moved to England the genetic loss to the remaining English would
be equivalent to 209,000 children. If the corresponding number arrived from the
India the ‘loss’ would be 2.6 million children. And if the same number of Bantus
came the genetic loss would be equivalent to 13 million children (Salter, 2002:
123–4).
While Salter’s argument has been popular among white nationalists (see Malik,
2008), he stresses that these losses can occur to any group receiving immigrants:
European colonisation displaced indigenous populations in the Americas and
Oceania. And he is careful to stress the importance of ‘universal nationalism’, that
is, the rights of all peoples to a secure homeland (Salter, 2002: 134). The problems
with Salter’s argument are ultimately philosophical. Two major criticisms can be
made. First, he seems to commit the naturalistic fallacy: turning an empirical claim
about genetic relatedness into a claim about what we ought to care about, namely,
our genes. He is aware of this and has argued that he is committed only to the
permissivenessof ethnic nationalism (and a restrictive immigration policy) and not
the requirementthat individuals should pursue it. In other words, states that pursue
ethnic nationalism should not be stigmatised as ‘racist’.
The second objection is that what we care about are not our genes but what our
genes produce. Genes never interact directly with the environment. They produce
or express traits (phenotypes) that are more or less successful. The more successful
phenotypes enable the genes that code for them to survive. Take the case of blue274 Part 2 Classical ideologies