and surface configurations of marks arenotlurking in the world to be noted and
recorded independently ofourconstruing-establishing of relevant resemblances
within a language of depiction.
Flint Schier has also attempted to distinguish visual representation or
depiction from linguistic representation, objecting, against Goodman, that
(unlike linguistic representations) visual depictions are informed by no syn-
tactic and semantic rules for recognizing the object that is represented.^27
This is true, but it again misses the mark, for it is just Goodman’s point that
depiction involves the use of a differentkindof language–syntactically and
semantically dense and relatively replete–from verbal representation.
Kendall Walton has objected against Goodman that denotation is not the
core of representation, since there could be a world in which people created
representations–used them as props in games of the make-believe presenta-
tion of objects–without supposing the objects in question actually to exist.
For example, it is possible for there to be a world in which people traffic in
visual representations of unicorns only, without there actually being any
unicorns. Hence visual representation cannot be understood as a function
of the picking out, construal, or denotation of the actual.^28
This objection too is not compelling. It is not clear in general which kinds
of worlds are possible and which are not. It is not clear specifically that there
could be people who use unicorn representations without also representing
actual horses, birds, and deer. Representations may have an inherent connec-
tion with some bits of actuality. Furthermore, Goodman accounts in detail
for the existence of depictions that depict nothing. A picture of a unicorn is
best understood as a kind of picture:aunicorn-presenting picturewith null
denotation. There can come to be these kinds of pictures that present non-
existent objects only because pictures can also be used to denote actually
existing objects. Unicorn-presenting pictures result from recombinations of
denotative elements from staghorn-depicting pictures and horse-presenting
pictures, some of which denote actual staghorns and horses.^29 Walton’s
objection underrates the extent to which world intake–denotation of the
actual–is required for representation in general.(^27) See Flint Schier,Deeper into Pictures: An Essay on Pictorial Representation(Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1986) and Goldman’s discussion of Schier’s work inibid., p. 139B.
(^28) Walton,Mimesis as Make-Believe, p. 125.
(^29) Goodman,Languages of Art, pp. 21–26.
34 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art