REPUBLIC(BOOKIV) 97
“Necessarily.”
“And producing health is settling the things in the body into a condition of master-
ing and being mastered by one another in accord with nature, while producing disease is
settling them into ruling and being ruled one by another contrary to nature.”
“That’s it.”
“Then in turn, as for producing justice,” I said, “isn’t that settling the things in the
soul into a condition of mastering and being mastered by one another in accord with
nature, while producing injustice is settling them into ruling and being ruled one by
another contrary to nature?”
“Exactly,” he said.
“Therefore, it seems likely that virtue would be a certain health, beauty, and good
condition of the soul, while vice would be a disease, deformity, and weakness.”
“That’s what they are.”
“And don’t beautiful practices lead to the acquisition of virtue, and shameful ones
to vice?”
“Necessarily.”
“So what remains at this point, it seems, is for us to consider next whether it’s
profitable to perform just actions, pursue beautiful practices, and be just, whether or not
it goes unnoticed that one is of that sort, or to do injustice and be unjust, so long as one
doesn’t pay the penalty or become better by being corrected.”
“But Socrates,” he said, “the question already appears to me to have become
laughable, whether, when life doesn’t seem worth living with the body’s nature
corrupted, even with all the foods and drinks and every sort of wealth and political rule,
it will then be worth living with the nature of that very thing by which we live disor-
dered and corrupted, even if someone does whatever he wants, but not the thing by
which he’ll get rid of vice and injustice and acquire justice and virtue, seeing as how it’s
become obvious that each of them is of the sort we’ve gone over.”
“It is laughable,” I said. “Nevertheless, since we’ve come this far, far enough to be
able to see clearly that this is the way it is, it wouldn’t be right to get tired out.”
“By Zeus,” he said, “getting tired out is the last thing we ought to do.”
“Come up to the mark now,” I said, “so you too can see how many forms vice has,
the way it seems to me, at least the ones that are even worth looking at.”
“I’m following,” he said; “just speak.”
“Well,” I said, “as though from a lookout spot, since we’ve climbed up to this
point in the discussion, there appears to me to be one look that belongs to virtue and
infinitely many to vice, but some four among them that are even worth mentioning.”
“How do you mean?” he said.
“There are liable to be as many dispositions of a soul,” I said, “as there are dispo-
sitions among polities that have looks to them.”
“How many, exactly?”
“Five for polities,” I said, “and five for a soul.”
“Say which ones,” he said.
“I say that one,” I said, “would be this type of polity we’ve been going over, but it
could be named in two ways, since if one exceptional man arose among the rulers it
would be called kingship, but aristocracy if there were more than one.”
“True,” he said.
“This, then,” I said, “is one form that I’m talking about, since whether one or more
than one man arose, it wouldn’t change any of the laws of the city worthy of mention,
since the upbringing and education they got would be the way we went over.”
“Likely not,” he said.
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