296 AUGUSTINE
first bad will bad? Now, the fact is that there was no first bad will that was made bad by
any other bad will—it was made bad by itself. For, if it were preceded by a cause that
made it evil, that cause came first. But, if I am told that nothing made the will evil but
that it always was so, then I ask whether or not it existed in some nature.
If this evil will existed in no nature, then it did not exist at all. If it existed in some
nature, then it vitiated, corrupted, injured that nature and, therefore, deprived it of some
good. An evil will could not exist in an evil nature but only in a good one, mutable
enough to suffer harm from this deprivation. For, if no harm were done, then there was
no deprivation and, consequently, no right to call the will evil. But, if harm was done, it
was done by destroying or diminishing what was good. Thus, an evil will could not have
existed from all eternity in a nature in which a previously existing good had to be elim-
inated before the evil will could harm the nature. But, if it did not exist from all eternity,
who, then, caused this evil will?
The only remaining suggestion is that the cause of the evil will was something
which had no will. My next question is whether this “something” was superior, inferior,
or equal to the will. If superior, then it was better. So, then, how can it have had no will
and not rather a good will? If equal, the case is the same: for, as long as two wills are
equally good, one cannot produce an evil will in the other. The supposition remains,
then, that it was an inferior thing without a will which produced the evil will of the
angelic nature which first sinned.
But that thing itself, whatever it was, even though it was low to the lowest point of
earthliness, was, without doubt good since it was a nature and a being having its own
character and species in its own genus and order. How, then, can a good thing be the
efficient cause of an evil will? How, I ask, can good be the cause of evil? For, when the
will, abandoning what is above it, turns itself to something lower, it becomes evil
because the very turning itself and not the thing to which it turns is evil. Therefore, an
inferior being does not make the will evil but the will itself, because it is a created will,
wickedly and inordinately seeks the inferior being.
Take the case of two men whose physical and mental make-up is exactly the
same. They are both attracted by the exterior beauty of the same person. While gazing
at this loveliness, the will of one man is moved with an illicit desire; the will of the other
remains firm in its purity. Why did the will become evil in one case and not in the other?
What produced the evil will in the man in whom it began to be evil? The physical
beauty of the person could not have been the cause, since that was seen by both in
exactly the same way and yet both wills did not become evil. Was the cause the flesh of
one of those who looked? Then why not the flesh of the other, also? Or was the cause
the mind of one of them? Again, why not the mind of both? For the supposition is that
both are equally constituted in mind and body. Must we say, then, that one was tempted
by a secret suggestion of the Devil, as if it were not rather by his own will that he con-
sented to this suggestion or enticement or whatever it was?
If so, then what was it in him that was the cause of his consent, of the evil will to
follow the evil suggestion? To settle this difficulty, let us suppose that the two men are
tempted equally, that one yields and consents to the temptation, that the other remains
as he was before. The obvious conclusion is that one was unwilling, the other willing, to
fail in chastity. And what else could be the cause of their attitudes but their own wills,
since both men have the same constitution and temperament? The beauty which
attracted the eyes of both was the same; the secret suggestion by which both were
tempted was the same. However carefully they examine the situation, eager to learn
what is was that made one of the two evil, no cause is apparent.