678 GEORGEBERKELEY
principle of individuation, possibility of matter’s thinking, origin of ideas, the manner
how two independent substances so widely different as spiritand matter,should mutu-
ally operate on each other? What difficulties, I say, and endless disquisitions, concerning
these and innumerable other the like points, do we escape, by supposing only spirits and
ideas? Even the mathematicsthemselves, if we take away the absolute existence of
extended things, become much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes and
intricate speculations in those sciences depending on the infinite divisibility of finite
extension; which depends on that supposition. But what need is there to insist on the par-
ticular sciences? Is not that opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the
ancient and modern sceptics,built on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much
as one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed utter
ignorance of their natures, which does not suppose their reality to consist in an external
absolute existence? Upon this supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of
colours in a pigeon’s neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be
allowed to have weight. But these and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain
the being of absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in ideas, fleeting
indeed, and changeable; however, not changed at random, but according to the fixed
order of nature. For, herein consists that constancy and truth of things which secures
all the concerns of life, and distinguishes that which is realfrom the irregular visions of
the fancy.
HYLAS: I agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can incline me
to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is attended with. I am by
nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment in knowledge. What doubts, what
hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement, what fields of disputation, what an ocean of
false learning, may be avoided by that single notion of immaterialism!
PHILONOUS: After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You may
remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination should
appear most agreeable to common sense and remote from scepticism.This, by your own
confession, is that which denies matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal things.
Nor is this all; the same notion has been proved several ways, viewed in different lights,
pursued in its consequences, and all objections against it cleared. Can there be a greater
evidence of its truth? Or is it possible it should have all the marks of a true opinion and
yet be false?
HYLAS: I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects. But, what
security can I have that I shall still continue the same full assent to your opinion, and
that no unthought-of objection or difficulty will occur hereafter?
PHILONOUS: Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once evidently
proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or difficulties it may be liable
to? Are the difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable quantities, of the
angle of contact, of the asymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out
against mathematical demonstration? Or will you disbelieve the Providence of God,
because there may be some particular things which you know not how to reconcile with
it? If there are difficulties attending immaterialism,there are at the same time direct and
evident proofs of it. But for the existence of matter there is not one proof, and far more
numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are those mighty dif-
ficulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what they are; something which
may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a sufficient pretence for withholding your full
assent, you should never yield it to any proposition, how free soever from exceptions,
how clearly and solidly soever demonstrated.