Consideringhowfartheknowledgeofthegeneralpubliclags
behindthemostrecentfindingsofzoologistsandethologists
who have spent months and sometimes years observing
animals with notebook and camera, the dangers of
sentimental anthropomorphism are less serious than the
oppositedangeroftheconvenientandself-servingideathat
animalsarelumpsofclaywhomwecanmoldin whatever
manner we please.
Thenatureofnonhumananimalsservesasabasisforother
attemptstojustifyourtreatmentofthem.Itisoftensaid,asan
objectiontovegetarianism, thatsinceotheranimalskill for
food, wemaydo sotoo. This analogywasalready old in
1785,whenWilliamPaleyrefuteditbyreferencetothefact
that while human beings can live without killing, other
animalshavenochoicebut tokillif theyaretosurvive.^14
Thisiscertainlytrueinmostcases;afewexceptionsmaybe
found—animalswhocouldsurvivewithoutmeat,but eatit
occasionally (chimpanzees, for example)—but they are
scarcelythespeciesweusuallyfindonourdinnertables.In
anycase,evenifotheranimalswhocouldliveonavegetarian
dietdosometimeskillforfood,thiswouldprovidenosupport
fortheclaimthat itismorally defensiblefor usto dothe
same. It is odd how humans, who normally consider
themselves sofar aboveotheranimals,will, ifitseems to
support their dietary preferences, use an argument that
implies that we ought to look to other animals for moral
inspiration and guidance. The point, of course, is that
nonhuman animals are not capable of considering the
alternatives,orofreflectingmorallyontherightsandwrongs
ofkillingforfood;theyjustdoit.Wemayregretthatthisis
thewaytheworldis,butitmakesnosensetoholdnonhuman
animals morally responsible or culpablefor what they do.