philosophicalandpractical difficulties,asIandothershave
indicated elsewhere.^22
Onapurelypracticallevel,onecansaythis:killinganimals
forfood(exceptwhennecessaryforsheersurvival)makesus
thinkof themas objectswe canusecasually forour own
nonessential purposes. Given what we knowabout human
nature,aslongaswecontinuetothinkofanimalsinthisway
wewillnotsucceedinchangingtheattitudesthat,whenput
into practice by ordinary human beings, lead to
disrespect—and hencemistreatment—fortheanimals. Soit
mightbebesttomakeitasimplegeneralprincipletoavoid
killing animals for food except when it is necessary for
survival.
Thisargumentagainstkillingforfoodreliesonaprediction
abouttheconsequencesofholdinganattitude.Itisimpossible
toprovethepredictioncorrect;thatissomethingonwhichwe
canonlymakeajudgmentonthebasisofourknowledgeof
ourfellowhumanbeings.Ifthispredictionisnotpersuasive,
though,theargument weareconsideringstillremainsvery
limitedinitsapplication.Itcertainlydoesnotjustifyeating
meatfromfactory-producedanimals,fortheysufferlivesof
boredomanddeprivation,unabletosatisfytheirbasicneeds
toturn around,groom,stretch,exercise, ortakepartinthe
social interactionsnormal for theirspecies. To bring them
intoexistenceforalifeofthatkindisnobenefittothem,but
rather a great harm. At the most, the argument from the
benefit of bringing a being into existence could justify
continuingtoeatfree-rangeanimals(ofaspeciesincapableof
having desires for the future), who have a pleasant existence
inasocialgroupsuitedtotheirbehavioralneeds,andarethen
killedquicklyandwithoutpain.Icanrespectconscientious