oncewerealizethatthefactthatabeingisamemberofour
ownspeciesisnotinitselfenoughtomakeitalwayswrongto
kill that being, we maycome to reconsider our policy of
preservinghumanlivesatallcosts, evenwhenthereis no
prospectofameaningfullifeorofexistencewithoutterrible
pain.
Iconclude,then,thatarejectionofspeciesismdoesnotimply
thatall livesareof equalworth.While self-awareness,the
capacitytothinkaheadandhavehopesandaspirationsforthe
future,thecapacityformeaningfulrelationswithothersand
soonarenotrelevanttothequestionofinflictingpain—since
painispain,whateverothercapacities,beyondthecapacityto
feelpain,thebeingmayhave—thesecapacitiesarerelevant
tothequestionoftakinglife.Itisnotarbitrarytoholdthatthe
life of a self-aware being,capable of abstract thought, of
planningforthefuture,ofcomplexactsofcommunication,
andsoon,ismorevaluablethanthelifeofabeingwithout
thesecapacities.Toseethedifferencebetweentheissuesof
inflictingpainandtakinglife,considerhowwewouldchoose
withinourownspecies.Ifwehadtochoosetosavethelifeof
a normalhuman beingoran intellectuallydisabled human
being,wewouldprobablychoosetosavethelifeofanormal
humanbeing; butif wehad to choose betweenpreventing
paininthenormalhumanbeingortheintellectuallydisabled
one—imaginethatbothhavereceivedpainfulbutsuperficial
injuries, and we only have enough painkiller for one of
them—itisnotnearlysoclearhowweoughttochoose.The
sameistruewhenweconsiderotherspecies.Theevilofpain
is, in itself, unaffected
bytheothercharacteristicsofthebeingwhofeelsthepain;
thevalueoflifeisaffectedbytheseothercharacteristics.To
givejustonereasonforthisdifference,totakethelifeofa