the war. MacArthur, who saw himself uniquely
able to interpret the oriental mind, did not believe
that the Chinese would risk war against a victori-
ous US army; a tough policy, he counselled, would
be much more likely to deter them than attempts
at appeasement. Truman, who was not so sure,
vacillated, trying on the one hand to reassure com-
munist China and on the other sanctioning a pol-
icy of crushing the North Koreans. But these
differences between the commander in the field
and Washington did not present an unbridgeable
gulf until, in military adversity, MacArthur’s con-
duct posed a challenge to the president’s authority.
As long as MacArthur was turning defeat into vic-
tory he had the backing of the country and the
administration, even while there were nagging
doubts in Washington that his mercurial tempera-
ment and self-esteem might expand US policy
beyond the aim of restoring peace in Korea.
In Washington the concept of a ‘limited war’
was developed and first applied in Korea. The
conflict was deliberately limited in two ways. It
was fought as a localised war geographically: the
Truman administration would not extend it to
China, even when Chinese ‘volunteers’ poured
into Korea, nor would it take the risk of a Soviet
entry and ensuing global war. It was also limited
in that it was fought with conventional weapons:
the use of nuclear arms was ruled out.
The reasons for Truman’s decision to limit the
war in Korea, a vital decision rightly taken, were
neither understood nor approved by General
MacArthur. He saw it as his duty to safeguard the
lives of the men under his command and to fight
for a complete and not a partial victory – yet the
White House would not allow him to take up
Chiang’s offer of troops. MacArthur was also
instructed that it was not part of UN aims to assist
the Chinese Nationalists to retake the mainland
of China. His immediate task was to stop the
complete rout of the South Korean army. He bril-
liantly stabilised a short front in July and August
1950, covering the bridgehead of Pusan, a mere
Korean toehold. The North Koreans had hesi-
tated and missed the opportunity to occupy the
whole of Korea.
With the best of North Korean troops concen-
trated on the tip of the Korean peninsula prepar-
ing to drive the growing American reinforcements
into the sea, MacArthur executed one of the most
audacious and successful counterstrokes in mili-
tary history. In mid-September, he conducted an410 THE TRANSFORMATION OF ASIA, 1945–55
Seoul, or what’s left of it, in 1950 after MacArthur’s
recapture. © National Archives, Washington
US marines are caught by surprise by Chinese ‘vol-
unteers’ and have to retreat after MacArthur
crosses into North Korea anticipating a victorious
end to the war. © National Archives, Washington