demand? Given its fears of Egyptian rearmament,
Israel might well make a pre-emptive attack on
Egypt, and in that event the British and French
could justify military intervention to keep the
combatants apart and at a distance from the
Canal.
An Israeli delegation led by the redoubtable
Golda Meir arrived in Paris and went into secret
talks on 30 September and 1 October. Mollet and
Pineau outlined their scheme. For the Israelis a
war with Egypt might determine their country’s
future existence, yet relations with Britain after the
Israeli raids into Jordan had sunk to a new low.
Indeed, since the days of the Mandate, Britain had
not been held in high esteem in Israel nor
regarded as trustworthy. What if Jordan joined in
on the Egyptian–Israeli war? Golda Meir wanted
to know on whose side Britain would then fight.
Pineau did his best to persuade the Israelis that
Britain’s priority would be the defeat of Egypt but
he went on to explain that the British government
needed a pretext to attack Egypt.
The first two weeks of October were decisive.
At the beginning of the month Eden was still
undecided, the chancellor of the exchequer
Harold Macmillan was a hawk and the foreign
secretary Selwyn Lloyd a dove. Under the aegis
of the United Nations, Selwyn Lloyd was in New
York trying to negotiate a settlement of the Canal
problem directly with Mahmoud Fawzi, the
Egyptian foreign minister. Pineau, the French
foreign minister, who was also involved, was far
less keen on a peaceful outcome. On 12 October
they finally reached an agreement based on ‘six
principles’, and the UN Security Council
endorsed them. Eden cabled Selwyn Lloyd at
lunchtime on 14 October that he was ready to
negotiate further with the Egyptians and those
members of the Security Council anxious to see
the issue peacefully resolved.
The possibility of joint Anglo-French military
action seemed to have receded, though to main-
tain pressure on Egypt Eden reserved Britain’s
rights to use force if the Egyptians did not accept
a satisfactory settlement. But later that afternoon
Eden received two envoys from Paris. The French
prime minister wanted to know what Britain
would do if Israel attacked Egypt. The Tripartite
Declaration of 1950 had promised US, British
and French help to the victim of aggression,
though the French pointed out that Nasser had
recently repudiated its application to Egypt. The
French then revealed the plan they had discussed
with the Israelis on 30 September and 1 October:
Israel would attack Egypt and, on the pretext
of separating the combatants and safeguarding
the Canal, a French and British force would
invade Egypt and occupy the Canal Zone. Eden
promised to reply by 16 October but was clearly
attracted to the scheme.
Eden saw the French proposal as a possible
escape from mounting difficulties. War was
drawing closer in the Middle East and Britain
would not be able to keep out of it. Jordan was
in crisis. On 10 October, that is four days before
these crucial Anglo-French conversations in
London, in a massive reprisal raid on Qalquilya,
which marked the climax of Israeli–Jordanian
clashes, over seventy Jordanians were killed. The
Israelis were trying to foil an agreement between
Iraq and Jordan, backed by Britain, to bring Iraqi
troops to the help of the Jordanians. Where did
Britain stand? Its credibility in the Arab Middle
East and its strengthening of the Baghdad Pact
now depended on it honouring the defensive
alliance concluded with Jordan. Thus Britain
looked like being dragged in against Israel and on
the side of the Arab states if war broke out
between Israel on the one hand and Jordan and
Egypt on the other. This involvement in the
general Arab enmity towards Israel now cut right
across Britain’s own conflict with Egypt. France,
moreover was backing Israel. No wonder Selwyn
Lloyd thought that any outbreak of war would be
a disaster for Britain.
While French and Israeli military staffs worked
on plans to attack Egypt, Eden now made up his
mind that the best way out was to accept the
French plan of Anglo-French military action in
collusion with Israel. As part of this plan he could
ensure that Israel would not attack Jordan, and
so save Britain from the dilemma of defending it.
Time was now running out: military plans could
not be for ever revised and postponed without
demoralising British forces being readied for the
attack. On 16 October Eden and Lloyd returned