western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba. Fourth, Israel
undertook not to attack Jordan unless Jordan
attacked it; in that event the British would not
come to the aid of Jordan. An article was added
which stipulated that the agreement would be
kept strictly secret. Finally, it was stated that the
agreement would enter into force after the con-
currence of the three governments.
On 26 October the Israelis received France’s
assurance in a letter from the prime minister.
Britain’s agreement was circuitous; it took the
form of a letter to Mollet from Eden noting the
conversations at Sèvres and confirming ‘that in
the situation there envisaged they [Britain] will
take the action described’. Why such circumlocu-
tion? It was an attempt by Eden to lay the basis
for a denial that there had been any secret treaty
between the three countries to attack Egypt –
Eden believed it could be presented merely as a
contingency plan, setting down what Britain
would do in certain circumstances. He would
claim that he could not be certain the circum-
stances would arise. The difference unfortunately
was rather less than paper-thin. Eden had all
along wanted to avoid a treaty, any written and
signed agreement. But the hapless Dean, not
knowing this, had added his signature to Pineau’s
and Ben Gurion’s copies and taken his copy back
to London. Eden was upset when he learnt that
there was now a written record. Of course, if it
had all been entirely above board he would not
have minded. Dean was sent back to Paris to
retrieve all the copies so that they could be
destroyed. He did not succeed. Ben Gurion, ever
suspicious of the British, had carefully folded the
document in his pocket and returned with it to
Israel. Neither he nor Pineau would now give up
their copies. The British request added a touch of
humiliation to the subterfuges adopted to cover
up the secret arrangements. The way was now
clear for the military plans to go ahead.
If the collusion with Israel was not to be
obvious, the Anglo-French invasion of the Canal
Zone could only take place for logistical reasons
six days after the Israelis began the campaign. The
troops that would have to be conveyed to Port
Said were assembled in Malta and Cyprus; it was
expected to take eight days from the start of
Israel’s attack to ferry them to Egypt. Nor could
the parachute brigade stationed in Cyprus be
dropped immediately without land support, so
they too would have to wait. But it was part of
the secret tripartite agreement that Egyptian air-
fields would be bombed at dawn on 31 October,
some thirty-six hours after the Israeli attack, so as
to put the Soviet-supplied Egyptian bombers out
of action. The French had also secretly agreed to
station their fighters in Israel to protect its cities.
The final preparations were made with the
Americans still being kept in the dark. The
Hungarian rising was occupying the headlines of
the world press. The presidential elections too
were rapidly approaching, with voting on 6
November. A few ships were authorised to leave
Valletta Harbour in Malta on Sunday night, 28
October, and the aircraft-carriers on the morning
of the 29th, that is before the Israeli attack that
same afternoon. All that weekend preparations
had been actively under way in Malta and Cyprus.
The Anglo-French and Israeli troop movements
alerted Dulles and Eisenhower in Washington.
But from London to Washington there was a
freeze on all communication about the impend-
ing Suez war. The majority of government min-
isters in London too were not fully briefed. The
same was true of British ambassadors abroad, so
great was the secrecy insisted upon by Eden.
At 5 p.m. on 29 October the Israelis began
their attack as arranged. Their prime object was
to reach the tip of the Sinai Peninsula, where the
batteries at Sharm al-Sheikh were closing the
Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. The batteries
were taken on 5 November. A diversionary thrust
towards the Canal also began on 29 October and
was completed by 2 November, with Israeli para-
chutists, after suffering severe casualties, captur-
ing the Mitla Pass some forty miles from the
Canal. On 30 October Britain and France sent
their ultimatum to Egypt and Israel to withdraw
ten miles from the Canal, according to the Sèvres
scheme. Egypt was given just twelve hours to
reply.
In Washington the response was anger, height-
ened by the fact that the British–French–Israeli
defiance of international law was distracting atten-
tion from the brutal Soviet repression of