The Polish and Hungarian crises, following on
Khrushchev’s violent denunciation of Stalin and
advocacy of reform, undermined the Soviet
leader’s position within the Kremlin. He had
never been strong enough to oust the Stalinists in
the Praesidium (Politburo), among them Molotov
and Malenkov, who now attacked him on the eas-
iest of targets – the economy, which under cen-
tralist control never lived up to expectations. The
struggle took the form of disputing which were
the right reforms to follow: reforms which sought
to make the government ministries more efficient,
a policy backed by Malenkov and Molotov, or
reforms based on reconstituted party control over
the economy regionally organised, as advocated
by Khrushchev. The conflict came to a head in
June 1957 when the Praesidium, by a majority of
seven to four, voted against Khrushchev. That
should have been the end. But Khrushchev turned
the tables by appealing to the larger party body,
the Central Committee, which he claimed alone
could deprive him of the post of first secretary.
With Marshal Zhukov’s help, military aircraft flew
the party representatives to Moscow from the out-
lying provinces. Khrushchev won the support he
needed and dubbed his opponents on the
Praesidium the ‘anti-party’ group. All these oppo-
nents now lost real power for good, but there was
to be no return to Stalinist vengeance. They were
sent far away; it was with a touch of humour that
Khrushchev decided to send the dour Molotov as
ambassador to Mongolia and Malenkov to man-age a power station in Kazakhstan; only Bulganin
was allowed to remain at the centre, acting as tit-
ular premier until 1958.
From 1957 until his sudden deposition by the
Praesidium in 1964, Khrushchev dominated
the Soviet Union in its domestic and foreign rela-
tions, though not as Stalin had done. Opponents
no longer had to fear death, but a displeased
Khrushchev could end their careers and demote
them or banish them. His enduring contribu-
tion was to dismantle the Stalinist terror regime
and to discredit it. Indeed, discrediting it became
a potent weapon with which to defeat his ri-
vals, who had played subordinate roles in it.
Khrushchev restored the party, with its hierarchy
appointed by him, to primacy in the economic and
political administration of the country. This meant
that no far-reaching economic reforms would be
possible: the Soviet Union remained a command
economy. But it had become a more tolerant
country; its leader was the son of a miner, robustly
human, resilient, tough, with a sense of humour,
unpolished in speech and manner, but someone
with whom it was thought in the West it was pos-
sible to do business. Khrushchev announced that
he believed in peaceful competition and that the
Soviet Union would win; boastfully he added, ‘We
will bury you’, a remark which was taken too liter-
ally in the West. Khrushchev genuinely wanted to
better the lot of the ordinary people in his own
day, not to sacrifice them to some future goal. He
comes across as a man who wanted to be liked, but(^1) Chapter 44
THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WIDER WORLD