and bombers close to the US would have been
seen as a Soviet advance into the Western hemi-
sphere and would have supported Khrushchev’s
boast that the Monroe Doctrine was dead.
Although there was much criticism among
NATO allies of America’s failure to consult ade-
quately during the crisis, had the US hesitated to
accept so direct a challenge to what it regarded
as its own vital interests (even though there were
many who criticised the current US interpretation
of the Monroe Doctrine), doubts would have
been raised about its readiness to defend Western
Europe in the face of a Russian threat with
nuclear weapons out of fear that this could have
led to a nuclear attack on the US.
As we now know, Kennedy did not always
retain his cool judgement during the crisis, and
his nerves were at times stretched taut, but he
always regained his balance in time. He did not
jump to hasty conclusions, did not surround
himself with men who would tell him only what
he wanted to hear. On the contrary he encour-
aged free discussion of all the different points of
view, an exploration of every option, while reserv-
ing to himself the final decision. His handling of
his colleagues was skilful, as he took care to extract
every piece of information that might be import-
ant in his decision-making. He did not allow
himself to be rushed into overreaction. While it
is true that the roots of the crisis must be attrib-
uted to Washington’s handling of Castro since
1959, the immediate cause was Khrushchev’s
decision to challenge US dominance in the
Caribbean. Had he succeeded in that challenge,
what would he have tried next? He would cer-
tainly have been encouraged to ‘rectify’ Soviet
weaknesses elsewhere, for instance in Berlin.
The crisis was followed by a reassessment of
nuclear-war theories. McNamara became a
convert to the view that nuclear weapons could
not be used in limited war; indeed, they were not
weapons that could be used at all except as a
deterrent to starting a war; and so the doctrine of
mutual assured destruction (MAD) was devel-
oped. According to this theory, peace between
the Western and Eastern alliances, could be pre-
served provided each side knew that it could not
knock out the arsenal of an opponent’s nuclear
missiles in a first strike; in other words, a suffi-
cient number of missiles would survive a hostile
first strike and would be used in a counter-attack
to destroy the opponent’s country. An important
lesson learnt from the crisis was that the ‘game’
approach to handling international relations was
far too dangerous in the nuclear age.
Rusk’s ‘they blinked first’ conclusion is more
appropriate to the era of the Hollywood Western
than to a nuclear showdown. One significant
result of the crisis was the establishment of a ‘hot
line’ between the Kremlin and the White House
in 1963 in an effort to avoid any future possibil-
ity of miscalculation. It was not actually a tele-
phone link but a simple teleprinter. This was later
improved and by 1983 maps and other data could
be rapidly transmitted.
The two superpowers had discovered common
interests. The most important was that ‘surprises’
were exceedingly dangerous in the nuclear age.
There was also an urgent need to prevent more
and more nations from acquiring the capacity to
make their own nuclear weapons: control should
be retained in the hands of the superpowers. Two
agreements were concluded in the next five years,
designed to inhibit development by other nations.
In August 1963 the ‘limited’ Test Ban Treaty was
signed. This forbade testing in the atmosphere, in
outer space and underwater; but, because the
Soviet Union and the US wanted to develop their
weapons further, testing underground was per-
mitted. That was one serious flaw; another was
that no nation could be forced to join. France
and China continued to test their weapons in
the atmosphere. The second treaty, which was
expected to be more significant, was the agree-
ment on the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons, signed on 1 July 1968. This bound its
signatories not to transfer their nuclear weapons
to non-nuclear nations or to help them to man-
ufacture their own weapons. The Soviet Union
had already recognised its common interests with
the US by withdrawing all assistance from China.
Just as important as the bombs were the mis-
siles that delivered them. Britain was a third sig-
natory to these treaties of the ‘nuclear club’; it
made its own hydrogen bombs but needed US