Bosnia to declare independence in 1992, knowing
that it would lead to bitter conflict between
Muslims, Croats and Serbs.
Serbia’s population of 9.7 million was twice
that of Croatia (4.8 million) and Bosnia (4.4
million), and the Yugoslav People’s Army (the
JNA) generally followed orders from Belgrade.
This placed Serbia in a dominant position. Presi-
dent Milosˇevic ́’s aim was to unite all Serbs if
Serbia was no longer able to dominate a federal
Yugoslavia; he therefore regarded any declaration
of independence by Croatia and Bosnia based on
their existing frontiers as a challenge to greater
Serbia and he was ready to respond with force.
When Slovenia, with a population of less than 2
million, declared its independence on 25 June
1991, Milosˇevic ́ had already decided that since
there were few Serbs in Slovenia it could secede
from federal Yugoslavia with its existing territory.
After a few days of fighting, the Yugoslav army
withdrew from Slovenia. Croatia followed suit
declaring its independence on 26 June 1991.
Milosˇevic ́ was equally prepared to allow Croatia
to leave federal Yugoslavia provided the Croats
gave up Slavonia, a region in the extreme north-
east with a majority Serb population, and the
mainly Serb-populated territory of the Krajina
along Bosnia’s north-eastern frontier. Serb rebel
leaders in the Krajina had already declared inde-
pendence from Croatia. Thus Croatia was threat-
ened by rebellion from within, by Serbia and by
Serbia’s ally, Montenegro. Croatian president
Franjo Tudjman was an ardent nationalist and he
was determined to defend every inch of Croatian
territory. Bloody conflict became inevitable.
The wars that were to cause a loss of life and
destruction in the heart of Europe not witnessed
since the Second World War proceeded unchal-
lenged for four years: the most powerful coun-
tries of the West were unwilling to intervene and
even connived to reward the principal aggressor,
Serbia. At first the European Community attempt-
ed to cool the crisis by declaring that it would
not recognise unilateral declarations of inde-
pendence by any of the republics. Yet only a
week later Douglas Hurd, the British foreign
secretary, stated that a republic could not be
forced to remain in the federal state ‘by shooting
its citizens’. Public opinion in Western Europe
had supported Slovenia’s assertion of independ-
ence. But generally the leaders in the republics
showed scant regard for the views of the European
leaders when it suited them. On 8 July 1991,
without reference to the European Community,
the Slovenian declaration of independence was
formally accepted by all the Yugoslav republics;
no triumph this for EC diplomacy.
However, in Croatia and Bosnia the situation
was quite different. In Croatia President Tudjman,
aware of his country’s military unpreparedness,
had unsuccessfully tried to postpone an unde-
clared war. The Krajina was lost to indigenous
Serb rebels; Serb ‘irregulars’, aided by the JNA,
attacked eastern Slavonia. During the autumn of
1991 the Croats stood their ground in the town
of Vucovar. Its complete destruction and surren-
der on 20 November after a three-month siege
shocked the West; television sets broadcast the
grim fate of the civilian population. It was only
a taste of what was in store over the next four
years. The Croat prisoners taken in Vucovar were
massacred in cold blood or herded into concen-
tration camps, where they were starved and
beaten, their skeletal bodies reminiscent of Belsen
victims. The response of civilised Europe was
shockingly inadequate: the new military status quo
was accepted without question and mediation was
offered. A UN peacekeeping force was despatched
to Croatia, but the conquered Croat lands
remained in Serb hands. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ had
begun. This policy of appeasement was to become
a characteristic of Western diplomacy until 1995.
On the Dalmatian coast Dubrovnik was bom-
barded by the JNA in October 1991 but held out
for seven months; meanwhile, in another twist,
the Serbs and Croats had reached a secret agree-
ment to carve up Bosnia between them.
If it had been possible to resolve the conflict
through diplomacy and mediation, then one of
the plans submitted to the Croats, the Serbs and
Bosnians by the skilful mediator Lord Carrington,
sent by the European Community, might well
have proved a basis for ending it. There was to be
no shortage of mediators. In 1992 and 1993, after
the departure of Carrington, Lord David Owen
and Cyrus Vance took up the thankless task and
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