which Lord Grenville promptly rejected. In response, on 16 February
18oo Napoleon discussed with Talleyrand the possibility of a French
landing in Ireland; this seemed like a return to the Directory's strategy of
1798 but was merely a halfhearted riposte, a desire to seem to be doing
something about the British. But the ploy of whipping up French public
opinion against contumacious Austria and perfidious Albion worked
brilliantly. By April 18oo even the war-weary French were clamouring
for decisive action against their ancient foes.
Napoleon used the time between 18 Brumaire and May 18oo to
reorganize the Army, making sure it was paid up to date, well supplied,
and provided with new recruits. It was clear to everyone that Austria, not
England, was the target of his preparations. In April he appointed
Berthier to the Army of the Reserve, while coaxing Carnot back from
voluntary exile in Germany to take over at the Ministry of War. He got
the money he needed for the campaign by the simple expedient of
imprisoning the banker Gabriel Ouvrard 'on suspicion of treason' until
he provided a 'loan'. Napoleon planned a strategic offensive, aiming to
defeat General Kray and his army of Ioo,ooo men in the Black Forest and
Danube area at the same time as he took out Melas and the second
Austrian army of 90,000 in Italy. The overall objective was the
destruction of both armies and the occupation of Vienna.
At first Napoleon intended to fight the main campaign in Germany,
but this idea foundered on the intransigence of Moreau, who refused to
accept the First Consul's orders; apparently he considered that he was
still constitutionally on a par with Bonaparte, whom he anyway despised
as a Corsican upsta rt. Napoleon was angry at Moreau's insubordination,
but as yet his power base was not secure enough to proceed against a
highly popular general, who could act as a rallying point for the
disaffected. Stifling his rage, on 15 March he wrote a flattering letter to
Moreau to keep him sweet, contrasting the cares of consular office with
the joys of command in the field: 'I am today a kind of mannequin who
has lost his freedom and his happiness ... I envy your happy lot.'
Napoleon was now obliged to alter his plans so as to make Italy the
main theatre of operations, thereby reducing Moreau to a secondary role.
He aimed to use the Army of Reserve as a feint, moving it into
Switzerland as if guarding Moreau's lines of communication, then
swinging south to Italy through the Alpine passes. He therefore ordered
Moreau to launch an offensive against Kray in mid-April and push him
back to Ulm. Once Moreau had driven Kray back to a point where he
could not intervene, half of the Army of the Reserve would head for Italy,
leaving the other half to secure its communications back through
marcin
(Marcin)
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