meanwhile a further 8,ooo horses had died between Vilna and Vitebsk
and Ioo,ooo troops were absent from their units through illness,
desertion or straggling.
It was a sombre Napoleon who entered Vitebsk at 8 a.m. on 29 July, to
find a ghost town inhabited only by the sick and wounded and the local
canaille. He at once held a council of war, where Berthier, Murat and
Eugene all urged him strongly to halt the campaign in light of the
enormous losses in men and materiel. At first he was inclined to acquiesce
and again procrastinated, spending two weeks in Vitebsk and giving every
indication of being prepared to winter there. Eugene was overjoyed to see
him roll up his maps and declare that the I8Iz campaign was over: 'We
won't repeat Charles XII's folly,' he declared.
But this mood lasted just twenty-four hours. A cautious policy did not
suit Napoleon's temperament and he was not the man to tarry eight
months in Vitebsk when he could be in Moscow in twenty days. In vain
did Berthier, Duroc, Caulaincourt, Eugene and all his intimates press
him for a definite decision to winter either there or in Smolensk. He
rounded on them, accusing them of being soft and pampered, with
thoughts only of money, pleasure, hunting and the delights of Parisian
social life. It was not for that, he chided them, that he had made them
marshals of France. Besides, he knew Alexander and he was confident
that he would not abandon either Smolensk or Moscow without a fight.
'The very danger pushes us on to Moscow. The die is cast. Victory will
vindicate us.'
Once again (I I August) the Grande Armee resumed its reluctant march;
the Emperor set out two days later. By this time the two Russian armies
had united but the 'cold war' of mutual hatred between the two
commanders undid most of the potential advantage of this. There was no
question of a lightning strike towards Smolensk to catch Barclay and
Bagration unawares, for such a step would simply mean the Army's
outstripping its supply wagons. But the impatient Emperor still yearned
to get behind the enemy so as to be between them and Moscow and thus
force them finally to the battle they had so long avoided. Meanwhile
Bagration and his circle, who had grown increasingly fretful at the
constant retreating, taunted Barclay with cowardice and forced his hand.
When the two Russian armies united at the beginning of August, making
a force Izs,ooo strong, Barclay finally buckled under the pressure from
his critics, who by this time included the Czar. He laid plans for a
counterattack.
It has often been pointed out that Barclay had only two sensible
options: either to turn Smolensk into an impregnable fortress or to
marcin
(Marcin)
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