and even while it shrank in size daily, the French army was dangerously
strung out; what with Oudinot, who had defeated Wittgenstein at
Polotsk, and MacDonald, who was besieging Riga, Napoleon's front
extended 500 miles.
Moreover, if the Emperor had been honest with himself, he would
have reflected that he was no longer the great captain of 1796 or 1805.
The twenty-four hours stretched to thirty-six hours for it was only in the
small hours of 16 August that French advance units began to probe the
outskirts of Smolensk. Finally, the Emperor ordered a frontal assault,
even though the city was well fortified and defended. It was to be a
characteristic of the 1812 campaign that he tended to order frontal attacks
of the kind he would have spurned in the days of his greatness. This time
he justified his decision on the ground that, if he tried to ford the
Dnieper to the east, he would be vulnerable to a Russian counterattack
which could split his Army.
Accordingly, on 16 August, after a fierce bombardment of the city, he
ordered the three corps under Ney, Davout and Poniatowski to take the
suburbs of Smolensk. After grim hand-to-hand and building-to-building
fighting, the French finally took possession of the outreaches but then
found themselves faced by the fifteen-foot thick walls of the inner city. At
dusk the Russians still held the old town, with the French firmly
ensconced in the suburbs but with the prospect of a second siege of Acre
before them. Next day there was more bloody fighting which barely
altered the overall picture. At nightfall the Russians were still in
possession of the city, having taken terrible losses but having also inflicted
Io,ooo casualties on the French in the two-day battle. Napoleon's critics
are adamant that the battle was unnecessary, and that if he had crossed
the Dnieper farther east he could have cut the Smolensk-Moscow road. It
was the possibility of such a move that led the Russians to evacuate the
city during the night of 17-18 August, following recriminations between
Bagration and Barclay so vehement that relations between them finally
and irretrievably broke down.
Once again it was Bagration's accusing Barclay of cowardice that
caused violent antipathy. To Bagration, who wanted to stay and slug it
out for a third day, the order to retreat came close to treason and was an
insult to the patriots who fell in the defence of Smolensk. But Barclay had
read his opponent better, and there is no doubt that if he had remained
for a third day's fighting, he would have been surrounded. As it was, even
when retreating fast he was nearly encircled. Ney and Junot got round
behind him late on the 18th but the chance was lost when Junot refused
to press the attack. When he heard the news next day, Napoleon was
marcin
(Marcin)
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