Their arguments were various: the Grand Army was now reduced to
r6o,ooo effectives, many demoralized and exhausted, and would diminish
further as fresh garrisons were left along the route; the problems of
supply and horses were bound to multiply; if he lost a battle outside
Moscow his plight would be desperate, but if he won he would be bottled
up in Moscow for the six months of winter, unable to move against St
Petersburg until spring and with an ever more tenuous supply line.
Therefore he should dig in at Smolensk; both his flank armies had won
victories, he still had time to capture Kiev and Riga this year and he
could build up a new army behind the defensive screen at Smolensk by
promising Polish independence. But Napoleon argued that there was a
momentum in war which had to be seized. Excited by the news that
Barclay was going to make a stand some fifty miles to the east, he
exaggerated a skirmish fought at Valutino by Ney and Murat on 19
August (whose main result was another 6,ooo French casualties), swept
aside all objections and ordered an advance on Moscow. On 25 August
the Grand Army left Smolensk.
Once again the soldiers suffered terribly on the onward march. Stifled
by dust and pelted with rain, they used improvised masks against
sandstorms and were reduced to slaking their thirst with horses' urine
because of the shortage of water. Soon even that expedient became
problematical, as the horses were dying in thousands from starvation:
there were not enough fields for the horses to graze in and no time to let
them eat their fill even if there were. One division which crossed the
Niemen with 7,500 horses had just r,ooo left at the beginning of
September. Yet another factor contributing to the wastage of horses was
the cavalry tactics employed by the French. Alarmingly, Murat, the
dashing cavalry commander, revealed on this campaign that he knew
nothing whatever about the care of horses. Although the animals have
about the same stamina as humans over long distances, they must be
taken along slowly, alternating the walk and the trot, and fed well. At full
gallop a horse could not cover more than three miles without great risk
and could easily be killed by being forced to canter or slow gallop for five
miles without rest.
Usually Napoleon was good at bolstering the morale of his men, but
this time he remained aloof and did not share their hardships, choosing
instead to travel in some style. His personal impedimenta included eight
canteen wagons, a carriage for his wardrobe, two butlers, two valets, three
cooks, four footmen and eight grooms. He himself usually travelled in a
six-horse coach, sleeping on a makeshift couch if no suitable house or
marcin
(Marcin)
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