follows: 'It is difficult to control a people who for three hundred years
have never known war within their frontiers, who are ready to immolate
themselves for their country, and who are not susceptible to the
distinction between what is and what is not the usage of civilized
warfare.' Certainly a novel defence for war crimes.
As it became increasingly obvious that both Kutusov and the Czar
were stalling and all hopes of a negotiated peace were vain, Napoleon's
mood became increasingly uncertain and febrile. Unable fully to
comprehend Alexander's 'unreasonable' stance, he clung to self-delusion
and donned a mask of false optimism, in reality oscillating between inertia
and anxiety. Louis-Philippe Segur, whose diary is one of the most
important sources for the campaign, wrote: 'He prolonged his meals,
which had hitherto been so simple and short. He seemed desirous of
stifling thought by repletion. He would pass whole hours half-reclined, as
if torpid and awaiting, with a novel in his hand.'
Despite his previous scorn for novels, during the frustrating days in
the Kremlin he would often take them up but found them impossible to
read; he would stay on the same page for half an hour while his
preoccupied mind drifted off elsewhere. Sometimes he would seek
oblivion by playing vingt-et-un with Eugene de Beauharnais. More and
more he seemed to be in a dream world. When told his troops needed
winter clothing, he issued orders for their manufacture, but did not solve
the question of who was to manufacture them and where in a deserted
city. When informed that the artillery was short of horses, he at once
authorized the purchase of zo,ooo fresh mounts, though everyone knew
there were no fresh horses to be had. Finally, at a war council on 30
September attended by Murat, Davout, Ney, Eugene and Berthier, he
proposed marching on St Petersburg. This chimerical idea was at once
howled down by the marshals and Napoleon may not have been wholly
serious in suggesting it, but at least it held out the chance of activity
rather than stagnation, which is what the Emperor most wanted.
Yet finally the nettle had to be grasped: was the Grande Armee to
winter in Moscow, or was any other strategy feasible? Napoleon's
increasingly neurotic state was a reflection of his dilemma: he knew that
whatever course he opted for was fraught with risk and that he would
never forgive himself if he chose wrongly. This is surely why he again
delayed in a Russian city for no good reason, this time for a precious 35
days. It has been remarked wryly that it would have been better if the
great fire of 15-17 September had completely destroyed Moscow, as the
Emperor would then have been forced out. The options, repeatedly
canvassed at war councils of the marshals, were essentially threefold:
marcin
(Marcin)
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