Apatheia (ἀπάθεια): passionless calm, peace of mind. In verb form, ἀπαθέω means to free from passion. Epictetus: Discourses (seven
times noun, eleven times verb), see 4.3.8; twice in Enchiridion. Marcus uses it in verb form four times; see 6.16.2b–4a. In its single use as a
noun, he says that the closer a person is to apatheia, the stronger they are (11.18.5b). See pathos.
Aphormê (ἀφορμή): avoidance, disinclination, the impulse not to act (as a result of ekklisis). Opposite of hormê. Hormê/Aphormê is
the second of the three areas of training for Epictetus (3.2.1–3a), and the term appears frequently in the Discourses. Marcus doesn’t use the
term in this sense, only hormê.
Apotynchanô (ἀποτυγχάνω): to fail in gaining, hitting, achieving; to miss one’s purpose or to err. It appears twenty-four times in
Epictetus, often with orexis/oregô; see especially 3.2.1–3a. Diogenes Laertius says Zeno defined “want” as failing to gain what we yearn for
or reach out for (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 7.1.113). The term doesn’t appear in Marcus. This experience is a fundamental source
of disturbance in life. See also hamartanô.
Aproêgmena (ἀπροηγμένα): dispreferred things; indifferent in an absolute moral sense, but things of relative negative value and
naturally undesirable things, such as illness. Opposite of proêgmena. These terms don’t appear in either Epictetus or Marcus, but we
know from Diogenes Laertius that they were common Stoic teaching from Zeno and Chrysippus through Posidonius (Lives of the Eminent
Philosophers 7.1.102ff). Cicero rehearses Zeno’s use of the terms and offers the Latin equivalents of reiecta/praeposita (On the Ends of
Good and Evil and Academica, 1 .X.36–39). Seneca does not follow Cicero in this use, but uses commoda/incommoda
(advantageous/disadvantageous). “There are things in life which are advantageous and disadvantageous—both beyond our control” (Moral
Letters 92.16). Cicero makes it a subclass of reiecta/praeposita (On the Ends of Good and Evil 3.21).
Aretê (ἀρετή): Virtue, goodness, and human excellence; the source of absolute value. Hadot notes that the four cardinal virtues of
Plato are not fully present in Arrian’s presentation of Epictetus (The Inner Citadel, p. 238), but that in Marcus, who followed Epictetus
closely, they have a clear articulation and correlation to what Hadot calls “the three acts of the soul” (see chart). Diogenes Laertius says that
the four cardinal virtues were primary for the Stoics (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, “Zeno,” 7.92b): σωφροσύνη/sôphrosunê/self-
control, δικαιοσύνη/dikaiosunê/justice, ἀνδρεία/andreia/courage, φρόνησις/phronêsis/wisdom. Chrysippus said that experiencing wisdom
(phronimos) for even a moment is equal to an eternity of exercising aretê (Plutarch, Moralia 1062 ). Musonius Rufus said, “The human being
is born with an inclination toward virtue” (Lectures 1.7.1–2). Marcus mentions all four virtues in 3.6.1 and 5.12, and three (without courage) in
7.63, 8.32, and 12.15. We present them here as the aims of moral progress to which all our activity in the world is directed. Marcus says we
should let our virtues shine until we are extinguished (12.15). Epictetus does cite justice and self-control together in his discussion of virtue in
3.1.6b–9, where his use of σωφροσύνη is milder in the “even-tempered” sense (contrasted by him with “undisciplined”), and his preferred term
for self-control here (and elsewhere, appearing with wisdom/φρονίμῳ in 2.21.9) is ἐγκρατεῖς/egkrateis/mastery, or exercising control over
(contrasted with ἀκρατεῖς/akrateis/uncontrolled). Seneca uses the Latin virtus and says that “virtue is the only good” and is nothing less than
“true and steadfast judgment” (Moral Letters 7.32).
Askêsis (ἄσκησις): exercise, practice, disciplined training designed to achieve virtue. Epictetus sees three areas of training
(Discourses 3.2.1–3a, 3.12.8)—the famous doctrine of three topics (topoi) that scholars think was Epictetus’s unique contribution to late
Stoicism (see Long’s Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life, pp. 112–118; Hadot’s The Inner Citadel, pp. 89–100). Before
Epictetus, Seneca affirms the long-standing Stoic division of philosophy into three parts, which he calls “the moral, the natural, and the rational”
(Moral Letters 89.9). Epictetus, we argue, also sees three levels of discipline, moving from learning/study (μανθάνω/manthanô, appearing
seventy-nine times) to practice (μελετάω/meletaô, appearing fifty-four times; see Discourses 2.19.29–34, where he says “learn and diligently
practice”) to more rigorous training (ἀσκέω/ἄσκησις, appearing forty times). For the three levels of discipline, see 2.9.13–14. For Epictetus, the
exercise and training analogies run from wrestling and athletics (see the “invincible athlete” in 1.18.21–23; “true athlete in rigorous training” in
2.18.27–2), to the pankration (3.10.6–7), and the ultimate “hard winter training” (χειμασκησαι/cheimaskêsai) of soldiers (1.2.32, 4.8.35–37).
While each of these three areas of training and three levels of discipline reach into and inform one another, there is a clear sense of hierarchy
in the acts of the soul, moving up from desire through action to assent, and of making forward progress in our actions in the world, from study
to practice to hard training, toward virtue (see chart). For Marcus, who is often derisive of mere study, books, and displays of learning (2.2,
3.14, 5.5, 5.9), these words scarcely appear. He seems more interested in simply getting straight to putting things to the test in everyday life by
following the dictates of our guiding reason (hêgemonikon). In this way he is very much in tune with Epictetus’s memorable admonition
against spouting what you’ve learned without having digested it (see Discourses 3.21.1–3). For Marcus, the point of it all is to use our reason
to produce in action the virtues of self-control, courage, justice, and wisdom, which correlate to the topoi of Epictetus (see chart).
Ataraxia (ἀταραξία): tranquility, freedom from disturbance by external things. It is the fruit of following philosophy, according to
Epictetus (Discourses 2.1.21–22). It appears fourteen times in the Discourses and twice in the Enchiridion; see Discourses 2.2 (Arrian’s
caption of section), 2.18.28, 4.3.6b–8, and 4.6.34–35. It appears once in Marcus (9.31; not here).
Axia (ἀξία): the true value or worth of things; the relative value of things preferential; of people, meaning reputation or what’s
deserved. It appears eighteen times in Marcus; see 4.32, 5.1, 5.36, 9.1.1, and 12.1. Marcus quotes Epictetus on this concept in discussing
how to use the power of assent in the area of our impulses (11.37). For Epictetus, the term appears twenty-nine times in the Discourses and
twice in Enchiridion (36; not here). See Discourses 1.2.5–7, 4.1.170, 4.3.6–8, and 4.5.34–37. Overall, the idea is that we too often trade
things of great value for things of very little value, an idea that goes back to the teachings of Diogenes of Sinope, the founder of the Cynic
school, as described by Diogenes Laertius (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 6.2.35b).